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Article
Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights as the Cornerstone of African
Human Rights
Shedrack C. Agbakwat
This Article argues that economic, social, and cultural rights are the key
to effectively realizing human rights in Africa. It contends that human
rights discourse on the indivisible bundle of rights must be put into
practice in the African context, where these rights are people's primary
means of self-defense. First, the Article argues that African governments'
failure to enthrone enforceable socio-economic rights compromises civil
and political rights. It then examines the inextricable link between these
rights and development, arguing that there is no justification for
discriminatory enforcement of human rights. The Article addresses
factors inhibiting the realization of these rights. It highlights the broad
consequences of the continued marginalization of socio-economic rights.
Finally, it urges a rejection of the Western model and explores approaches
to improve the fortunes of these rights. It concludes that selective
enforcement of human rights in the context of worsening social, economic,
civil, and political conditions is a heedless truncation of humanity.
t Doctoral Candidate & Harley D. Hallett Graduate Scholar, Osgoode Hall Law School,
Toronto, Canada. LL.M. (Dalhousie) 2000; B.L. (Abuja) 1999; LL.B. (University of Nigeria)
1997; N.C.E. (Owerri) 1990. The research for this paper was made possible by generous LLM
funding from The Sir lzaak Walton Killam Pre-Doctoral Fellowship, Dalhousie University in
Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. I should like to thank Professors Hugh M. Kindred and
Esmeralda Thornhill of Dalhousie Law School and Professors Obiora Chinedu Okafor and
Craig M. Scott of Osgoode Hall Law School for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of
this paper, and for the many ways in which they helped to refine the ideas presented in this
paper. I am grateful to Solomon Ukhuegbe for his comments. My thanks to the editors of the
Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal for their very helpful comments. The usual
disclaimers apply. This paper is dedicated to Nkiru and Chidalu (my wife and son).
1
Agbakwa: Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as the Cornerstone of African Human Rights
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2002
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L. [
A point very often missed in human rights praxis is that economic,
social, and cultural rights (ESCR) "are the only means of self-defense for
millions of impoverished and marginalized individuals and groups all over
the world."' Despite the international rhetoric on the equal relevance,
interdependence, and indivisibility of all human rights, 2 in practice states
have paid less attention to the enforcement and implementation of ESCR,
and their attendant impact on the quality of life and. humain dignity of the
citizenry, than other rights.3 African states, still living with the nightmares
of slavery and colonial exploitation, are perhaps unsurpassed in this
dreamy, rhetorical exercise.
African states ought to take the lead in the enforcement of ESCR, given
Africa's deplorable socio-economic conditions. They ought not to emulate
the industrialized states of the North which can afford the luxury of hollow
rhetoric in the implementation of ESCR. Regrettably, African states have
so far failed to match their words with appropriate, sufficient action.4
Where African leaders have asserted the importance of satisfying ESCR as
part of protecting other rights, some have done so with the intention of
using this rhetoric as a ploy to suppress civil and political rights.5
1. Rolf Kunnemann, A Coherent Approach to Human Rights, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 323, 332 (1995).
2. See, e.g., Aft. Charter Hum. Peoples' Rts., June 27, 1981, pmbl., para. 8, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1982) [hereinafter Aft. Charter]; Proclamation of Tehran, Final Act of
theInternational Conference on Human Rights, May 13, 1968, art. 13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41
(1968), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS vol. 1 (2d part), at 51-54, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.5 (1994); Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, June 25, 1993, U.N. World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993); see also THE LIMBURG
PRINCIPLES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, Jan. 8, 1987, princs. 2-3,, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human
Rights, 43d Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17/Annex (1987), reprinted in 9
HUM. RTS. Q. 122, 123 (1987) (underscoring the indispensability of indivisibility and
interdependence); Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
guideline 4, reprinted in 20 HUM. RTs. Q. 691 (1998) (reemphasizing equality, interdependence
and indivisibility of all human rights). On interdependence generally, see Craig Scott, The
Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the
International Covenants on Human Rights, 27 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 769 (1989).
3. See Noam Chomsky, The United States and the Challenge of Relativity, in HUMAN RIGHTS
FIFTY YEARS ON: A REAPPRAISAL 24, 32-35 (Tony Evans ed., 1998); see also Scott Leckie, The U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Right to Adequate Housing: Towards an
Appropriate Approach, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 522, 525-26 (1989) (discussing the relative lack of state
action in spite of numerous resolutions affirming the legal validity of ESCR and indivisibility
of human rights).
4. This may in part be attributed to the prevailing unwillingness of the international
community to match its high-minded rhetoric with commensurate actions. In fact,
notwithstanding all pretensions to the contrary, there is evidence to support active
undermining of the efforts of the developing countries to realize ESCR by the developed
countries. See El Hadji Guiss6, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Final
Report on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations, U.N. Comm.
Hum. Rts., 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. E /CN.4/Sub.2/1997/8 (1997), available at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/impu/guisse.htmi (last visited Feb. 11, 2002).
5. In the past, repressive regimes in Africa (like Eyadema of Togo and Mobutu of Zaire)
have claimed that they could not allow basic civil and political rights in their various states so
long as there were prevailing economic hardships and the population remained underfed
and economically underdeveloped. While it is true that economic development might lead to
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Africa's worsening socio-economic conditions, and resulting
exacerbation of civil and political strife coupled with the current lack of
interest in the enforcement of ESCR,6 renders the effective realization of
human rights on the continent a remote possibility. Even if largely
unintended, the neglect of ESCR, a substantial part of an indivisible whole,
has brought about this sad state of affairs. This Article contends that there
is an urgent need for a change of attitude and a relocation of emphasis
from neglect and discriminatory enforcement of human rights to respect
and balanced, holistic enforcement. Given the prevailing socio-economic
circumstances in Africa, ESCR remain the cardinal means of self-defense
available to the majority of Africans.
Part I of this Article emphasizes the imperative of a holistic and non-
discriminatory enforcement of all human rights in Africa and links the
failure of African governments to safeguard the socio-economic rights of
their citizens to the widespread incidence of civil and political strife. Part I
contends that, in contemporary Africa, a government's legitimacy is largely
a function of its ability to guarantee and protect the ESCR of its people.
In contrast to many scholars and commentators who have pointed to
the under-development and acute economic crises of African states as the
reasons behind the non-enforcement of ESCR, 7 Part II contends that under-
development and economic crises are hardly the whole story. It argues that
recognition and enforcement of these rights catalyze development and are
inextricable from it. Any quest for meaningful development ought to be
predicated on the effective protection, enforcement, and realization of
ESCR. While mindful of the poor economic conditions of many African
states, Part II argues that these conditions do not justify outright non-
enforcement of ESCR.
Part III discusses some factors militating against the realization of
ESCR in Africa. Part IV highlights the consequences of the continued
marginalization of these rights. In strategizing the way forward, Part V
articulates alternative enforcement approaches that will ensure a non-
discriminatory and more effective enforcement of ESCR. In Part VI, I shall
offer a few concluding remarks.
The aim of this Article is not to analyze the various rights traditionally
classified as ESCR. Rather, it seeks to question the marginalized
enforcement of ESCR as codified in the African Charter (work, health,
the improvement of the civil and political rights as a result of improvement in the quality of
life, it cannot be shown that the curtailment of the civil and political rights of the people can,
in any way, contribute to the improvement of their socio-economic rights and development.
Its only contribution is the preservation of the repressive regimes in question. On this and
related issues, see Peter R. Baehr, Concern for Development Aid and Fundamental Human Rights:
The Dilemma as Faced by the Netherlands, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 39, 43-44 (1982); Rhoda Howard, The
Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence
from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HuM. RTs. Q. 467, 468-78 (1983); Rhoda Howard, The Dilemma of
Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, 35 INTL J. 724, 725 (1980).
6. See J. Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and
Social Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1995).
7. See, e.g., R.M. D'sa, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Problems and
Prospects for Regional Action, 10 AuSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 101, 114 (1987).
2002]
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education, and cultural rights), including the "new rights," 8 such as access
to the public services of one's country, public property, and other services. 9
The Charter does not expressly provide for housing or social security rights.
But, except as otherwise indicated, this Article does not exclude these or
other socio-economic rights from its purview. This Article focuses on the
collective marginalization of ESCR, broadly construed. It focuses on
particular ESCR merely to illustrate points.
I. THE IMPERATIVE OF A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT
"Perils to the part imperil the whole." 10
In the 1993 Vienna Declaration," the consensus opinion recognized the
futility inherent in entrenching civil and political rights without the
corresponding ESCR. This consensus emerged despite the bipolar (East-
West) ideological differences, which then dominated international
relations, and led to the implementation of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) by means of two international covenants, and
continue to have grave implications for ESCR. 12 Long before the Vienna
Declaration, the UDHR set the parameters for evaluating the legitimacy of
governmental actions by codifying "the hopes of the oppressed, [and]
supplying authoritative language to the semantics of their claims." 13 The
euphoric "Never Again" declaration by the victorious powers after World
War II was intended to encapsulate humanity's resolve to banish human
misery in all its ramifications, whether arising from physical abuse or from
want.
If the purpose of government is to provide for the welfare and security
of all citizens, governments fail to fulfill this purpose when they commit to
enforcing only civil and political rights. Such an ostrich-like posture denies
the various forms of state abuse against which the citizen must be
8. Chidi Odinkalu, Analysis of Paralysis or Paralysis by Analysis? Implementing Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 23 HuM. RTs.
Q. 327, 339 (2001).
9. See Afr. Charter, supra, note 2, art. 13
10. Ebow Bondzie-Simpson, A Critique of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
31 How. L.J. 643, 660 (1988).
11. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 2; see also Shadrack Gutto,
Beyond Justiciability: Challenges of Implementing/Enforcing Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa, 4
BUFF. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 79, 86-88 (1998) (discussing the Vienna Human Rights Conference
and its outcome)
12. The ideological altercation that produced two covenants arguably confined ESCR to,
in the words of-one scholar, "human rights regime's shabby second cousin." See Krysti Justine
Guest, Exploitation Under Erasure: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Engage Economic
Globalization, 19 ADEL. L. REV. 73, 82 (1997). For an overview of the history behind the two
covenants, see Matthew Craven, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 1-16 (1995), and Peter Cumper,
Human Rights: History, Development and Classification, in HUMAN RiGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 1, 6-7 (Angela Hegarty & Siobhan Leonard eds., 1999).
13. See Jose A. Lindgren Alves, The Declaration of Human Rights in Postmodernity, 22 HUM.
RS. Q. 478,481 (2000).
[Vol. 5
4
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 5 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol5/iss1/5
2002] Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Africa
protected: above all, the state's neglect of its citizens. 14 Even opponents of
enforceable ESCR recognize this axiom. The defacto commitments of many
Western states to a welfare ethos 5 , despite their official opposition to
ESCR, assures a high degree of compliance in protecting the rights of their
citizens. 16
Modern governments are active participants, not passive spectators, in
events that fundamentally impact the ability of the people to lead a
meaningful and dignified life.' 7 Governance ceases to be meaningful when
the majority of the people is put in a situation where it cannot appreciate
the value of life, let alone enjoy its benefits, and where it lacks the
appropriate mechanisms to compel change. Where human survival needs
frequently go unmet, as in Africa, protection of human rights ought to
focus on "preventing governments from neglecting their citizens." 8
A point that is often overlooked in contemporary human rights
discourse and practice is that the greatest benefit of guaranteeing
enforceable rights is the assurance it gives to people that effective
mechanisms for adjudicating violations or threatened violations of their
rights are available. As events in many parts of Africa have shown,19 the
absence of such mechanisms gives the impression that resort to extra-legal
means, such as armed rebellion, is the only way to improve one's condition
or challenge governmental abuse and neglect.20 Most current African
14. An example of the right to protection against state neglect is the case Laxmi Kant v.
Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.C. 67, in which the Indian Supreme Court held that the right of
children to life and livelihood included the right to be protected by the state against emotional
and material neglect.
15. It should, however, be pointed out that the defacto commitment to a welfare ethos has
become a victim of globalization even in rich societies, where the dismantling of the
institution of the welfare state is seen as a necessary step for the efficacy of state management.
Thus, social exclusion and human misery are being transformed into a new economic
ideology. See Alves, supra note 13, at 485.
16. See Richard Falk, The Challenge of Genocide and Genocidal Politics in an Era of
Globalisation, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL POLMCS 177, 190 (Tim Dunne & Nicholas Wheeler
eds., 1999); see also Jack Donnelly, Human Rights, Democracy and Development, 21 HUM. RTS. Q.
608, 629-30 (1999) (noting the use of the welfare system by all existing liberal democracies to
compensate some of "those who fare less well in the market" and that this system "remains a
powerful force in all existing liberal democratic regimes and a central source of their
legitimacy").
17. See Abubakar Momoh & Said Adejumobi, THE NIGERIAN MITrrARY AND THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIc TRANSmON: A STUDY IN THE MONOPOLY OF POWER 211 (1999) (questioning the
basis, rationale and justification for the existence of the state and its control over national
wealth, and its overall responsibility where it fails to live up to its health, educational,
employment and other social obligations to the people).
18. Carol M. Tucker, Regional Human Rights in Europe and Africa: A Comparison, 10
SYRACUSE J. IN'L L. & COM. 135, 162 (1983).
19. Notable examples are the internecine fratricidal conflicts involving different
communities in Nigeria, such as the Niger Delta, Ife-Modekeke, and other religious-political
conflicts in the northern parts of the country. Other examples are the fratricidal conflicts in
Congo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, as well as the unending conflicts in Somalia. See Segun
Odunga, Achieving Good Governance in Post-Conflict Situations: The Dialectic Between Conflict and
Good Governance 41, 42-49 in AFRICAN CONFLICTS, infra note 23.
20. This assertion holds true for all rights. Generally people tend to develop means of
expressing their grievances. Where they are denied an organized avenue, such as the courts
or other tribunals, they resort to extra-legal means. Essentially the gist of human rights has
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conflicts consist of people who are fighting not against themselves but
against poverty and governmental inaction in the face of destitution. This
conflict usually is due to many years of impoverishing neglect and to the
absence of other viable ways of compelling meaningful change. Because
governments are increasingly expected to meet the basic needs of their
citizens, there is a growing tendency to demand results in militant terms,
particularly in the absence of a proper forum to compel governmental
action.21 As Callisto Madavo, World Bank Vice President for the African
region, observes, "Africa's wars are not driven.., by ethnic differences.
As elsewhere, they reflect poverty, lack of jobs and education, rich natural
resources that tempt and sustain rebels, and [ineffective and insensitive]
political systems. . .. "22
These are, for the most part, socio-economic and political conflicts
among ethnically differentiated peoples. Although holistic protection of all
rights will not prevent every conflict, it will defuse the majority of conflicts
that are triggered or sustained by those who exploit abject socio-economic
conditions. 23 Scholars have demonstrated a causal link between these
conflicts, which can be seen as a people's violent resistance to their
deplorable socio-economic conditions,24 and the absence of perceived
modes of effecting a peaceful change. On the psychological level, it has
been observed that:
[T]he gap between what a people expect as being just and fair and
what they actually have can heighten a sense of unfair treatment
and so develop a sense of deprivation.... Feelings of
deprivation.., provide fertile grounds for mobilizing opposition
and the affected group with the real potential for collective
violence and social instability. Economic, social and political
always revolved around maintaining a balance between the haves and the have-nots. Even
the so-called civil and political rights, as a pseudonym for western liberalism, emerged in
different forms. As Falk points out, they emerged "as a centrist compromise that offered
enough to those currently disadvantaged to discourage recourse to revolution while
providing essential stability for existing social and economic hierarchies." Falk, supra note 16,
at 180. It is arguable that the denial of socio-economic rights in Africa has assumed
revolutionary proportions akin to the pre-revolution denial of civil and political rights in
Europe, thereby justifying similar empowerment.
21. See Richard Falk, Responding to Severe Violations, in ENHANCING GLOBAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 205, 226 (Jorge I. Dominguez et al. eds., 1979).
22. See Callisto Madavo, Editorial, Stand Back and Take a More Positive Look at Africa, INT'L
HERALD TRIB. (Paris), June 6, 2000.
23. See Adebayo Adedeji, Comprehending African Conflicts, in COMPREHENDING AND
MASTERING AFRICAN CONFLICTS: THE SEARCH FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE & GOOD GOVERNANCE
10-12 (Adebayo Adedeji ed., 1999) [hereinafter AFRICAN CONFLICTS]; see generally Report of the
Secretary-General on the Causes of Conflict and Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable
Development in Africa, reprinted in 10 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 549, 549-53 (1998) (highlighting
causes of conflicts in Africa).
24. See Will H. Moore et al., Land Reform, Political Violence and Economic Inequality-Political
Conflict Nexus: A Longitudinal Analysis, 21 INT'L INTERACTIONS 335 (1996); Maro Ellina & Will
H. Moore, Discrimination and Political Violence: A Cross-National Study with Two Time Periods, 43
W. POL. Q. 267, 268-71 (1990).
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institutions that are perceived to have failed to address the
conditions producing deprivation become victims of vicious
campaigns that can lead to [violence] .... [TIhe fear of
unemployment and the strain of reduced economic security in
people's private lives can create tremendous anxiety and agitation.
Psychologically, reactions to unemployment, especially when it is
rising, and its attendant strain of reduced economic security may
create fear, frustration and aggression .... Conceivably, the fear of
social instability may increase the potential for violence.25
This relationship between deprivation and conflict underscores the
fundamental link between protection of human rights and stability. The
intimate relation between stability and human rights, in turn, reinforces the
necessity of guaranteeing the enforcement of all human rights without
exception. 26 Since the different fights are interconnected and operate in
support of each other, it logically follows that the full realization of one set
remains dependent on the realization of the other.27 In a state of instability
resulting from the denial of basic ESCR, it becomes difficult, if not
impossible, to realize civil and political fights, and vice versa.28
Apart from the instability it causes, the non-realization of ESCR creates
insurmountable obstacles to the enjoyment of civil and political rights.
People can only be free from abuse and exploitation when they have what
it takes to assert their rights and free themselves from exploitative rule.
Because the majority of Africans are illiterate and poor, they lack the
requisite knowledge and means to assert their rights, let alone enjoy them.
As U. 0. Umozurike observes:
A great impediment to the attainment of civil and political rights is
constituted by illiteracy, ignorance and poverty. To the many rural
25. Al-Hassan Conteh et al., Liberia, in AFRIcAN CONFLIcTS, supra note 23, at 118-19.
26. The link between neglect of ESCR and instability is further underscored by the U.N.
Secretary-General's eloquent testimony to the effect that unfulfilled basic needs constitute
"the deepest causes of conflict." Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,
An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, U.N. GAOR, at 4,
U.N. Doc. A/47/277/S/24111 (1992), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html
(last visited Feb. 2,2002).
27. See Pierre De Vos, Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human Rights?: Social and
Economic Rights in South Africa's 1996 Constitution, 13 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 67,71 (1997). De Vos
further elucidates that "[sitarving people may find it difficult to exercise their freedom of
speech while a restriction of freedom of speech may make it difficult for individuals to enforce
their right of access to housing." Id.
28. See Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action of the World
Summit for Social Development, at para. 5, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.166/9 (1995), available at
gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/OO/unconfs/wssd/summit/off/a-9.en (last visited Feb. 2,
2002) ("[Slocial development and social justice cannot be attained in the absence of peace and
security or in the absence of respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms"); see also
Wesley T. Milner et al., Security Rights, Subsistence Rights, and Liberties: A Theoretical Survey of
the Empirical Landscape, 21 HuM. RTs. Q. 403, 413 (1999) (underscoring the inextricable link
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dwellers in any African state, and indeed to the urban poor, the
lack of awareness or means make it impossible for them to assert
their rights. They are very much at the mercy of their rulers.29
Thus, even a society interested in protecting only civil and political
rights should give equal priority to ESCR as a practical means to achieving
the former. 30 An absence of the latter commitment deepens a collective
feeling of injustice. The majority, comprised of the more vulnerable
members of society, cannot but feel that it has been denied an accepted
forum for the recognition and redress of injustices.31 Moreover, the non-
enforcement of ESCR ridicules the so-called autonomy of the individual, a
concept that is the linchpin of civil and political rights. Adequate socio-
economic conditions must exist as a precondition to personal autonomy.32
As Joseph Raz illustrates:
A person whose every major decision was coerced, extracted from
him by threats to his life or that of children, has not led an
autonomous life. Similar considerations apply to a person who has
spent the whole of his life fighting starvation and disease, and has
no opportunity to accomplish anything other than to stay
alive...33
According to Raz, autonomy "affects wide-ranging aspects of social
practices and institutions .... Almost all major social decisions and many
of the considerations both for and against each one of them (whether civil
and political rights or ESCR) bear on the possibility of personal autonomy,
either instrumentally or inherently."34
African states have not failed to recognize the dangers of a selective -
as opposed to holistic -recognition of human dignity. The African Charter
remains a testament to the collective recognition of the indivisibility of
human rights and dignity. As parties to the Charter, African states
29. U.O. UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 41 (1997).
30. David Selby argues that "human rights do not stop at counting political prisoners any
more than they stop at counting the unemployed. Human rights are about human needs-
needs that extend from proper nutrition, clothing, shelter, health care and education to
participating in decisions that frame our lives." R. R. Akankwasa, Human Rights Education and
the Quest for Development: The Case of Ugandan Schools, 5 E. AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTS. 105, 108
(1999) (quoting DAVID SELBY, HUMAN RIGHTS 77 (1987)).
31. The discovery of injustice as such depends upon, and is aggravated by, the feeling that
one has rights that are not being respected. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a
Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 833 (1988). The feeling of injustice is
heightened when those who are making excuses of lack of resources for non-recognition of the
people's rights are unabashedly flaunting the wealth amassed from their concerted fleecing of
the people.
32. See Daniel Warner, An Ethics of Human Rights: Two Interrelated Misunderstandings, 24
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 395, 411 (1996).
33. Joseph Raz, Rights-Based Moralities, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 182, 192 (Jeremy Waldron
ed., 1984).
34. Id. at 193.
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apparently appreciate the necessity of a holistic approach to enforcement.
While this must be pursued at the international and regional levels -as the
African Charter seeks to do-the locus of active enforcement must be the
domestic arena where the mechanisms of enforcement will be within easy
reach of aggrieved citizens and thus more widely utilized.35 Moreover,
international protection or mechanisms are designed to complement the
domestic protection of human rights.36 As Theo van Boven persuasively
argues, international procedures "can never be considered as substitutes
for national mechanisms and national measures with the aim to give effect
to human rights standards. Human rights have to be implemented first
and foremost at national levels." 37
Anything short of a holistic enforcement of human rights at the
domestic level belies the African Charter's recognition that "the satisfaction
of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of
civil and political rights."38
Bifurcated enforcement is not in keeping with the virtues of Africa's
historical tradition and the values of African civilization, which are among
the founding philosophies of the Charter.39 African states subscribed to a
Charter that acknowledges the importance traditionally attached to these
rights, and, therefore, ought to do more than pay them lip service.
Rather than the existing approach to enforcement, which marginalizes
ESCR, action should be taken across the board to ensure a minimum level
of enjoyment of all human rights. As argued in the next section, the excuse
of impossibility of performance due to underdevelopment, often put
forward by African leaders and some scholars,40 does not represent the
whole truth. It is too often a rationalization for a lack of political will and
the continued elevation of luxury over necessity.
II. RIGHTS AND THE ARGUMENT OF DEVELOPMENT
The point is often made that development4' of Africa, and indeed of all
35. See Roman Wieruszewski, National Implementation of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS
IN A CHANGING EAST-WEST PERSPECTIVE 264, 279-84, (Allan Rosas & Jan Helgesen eds., 1990)
(discussing the importance of judicial remedy for the national implementation of human
rights).
36. See Allan Rosas & Martin Schenin, Implementation, Mechanisms and Remedies, in
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 355, 379 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds.,
1995).
37. Theo van Boven, The International System of Human Rights: An Overview, in MANUAL ON
HUMAN RIGHrs REPORTING, at 10, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/91/1, U.N. Sales No. GV.97.0.16 (1997);
see also Claude E. Welch, Jr., The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Five-Year
Report and Assessment, 14 HuM. RTs. Q. 43, 57-58 (1992) (arguing that enforcement of human
rights depends on state action).
38. See Aft. Charter, supra note 2, at pmbl., 8 (emphasis added).
39. See id. 5.
40. See, e.g., Umozurike, supra note 29, at 111.
41. The term "development" (a concept with varying and diverse definitions, long
considered synonymous, and used interchangeably, with the terms "growth" and "economic
development") is "often equated with economic development, usually measured as economic
growth, improved balance of payment, and other macroeconomic variables." Sigrun I. Skogly,
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Third World states, is a necessary precondition for the enforcement and
enjoyment of ESCR.42 It has been contended that African states cannot
reasonably be expected to fulfill their ESCR obligations under the African
Charter given their socio-economic problems, which arise from under-
development and "existing patterns of international trade." 43 Scholars
have also asserted that the poverty of African states44 justifies treating
ESCR as principles of state policy 45 (as they are in the constitutions of
Nigeria, Cameroon, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Namibia, Sierra Leone, and
Structural Adjustment and Development: Human Rights - An Agenda for Change, 15 HuM. RTS. Q.
751, 752-53 (1993); see also Theo Van Boven, Human Rights and Development: The U.N.
Experience, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL VIEWS 121, 125 (David P.
Forsythe ed., 1989). Consequently, a country's gross national product (GNP) per capita is
usually, if erroneously, used to determine its level of development, and it is generally believed
that economic development guarantees automatic improvement in other sectors and segments
of society. Yet, as Milner, Poe & Leblang convincingly argued, the use of GDP or GNP
variables to measure economic development does not "take into account economic inequality
among citizens" and "can sometimes mask the true underlying extent of development" since
"a country could have a high overall per capita GDP but also have a majority of the
population living in poverty." Milner et al., supra note 28, at 411; see also Danilo Turk,
Development and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 167,
167-73 (Louis Henkin & John L. Hargrove eds., 1994) (expressing a view similar to Milner's).
A more appropriate and acceptable definition of development is one that transcends purely
economic factors, as in the U.N. Declaration of the Right to Development, which defines
development in the second paragraph of its preamble as "a comprehensive economic, social,
cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of
the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful
participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom."
United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS vol. 1 (2d part), at 548, U.N. Doc.
ST/HR/1/Rev.5 (1994). On the interface of human rights and development, see Brigitte
Hamm, A Human Rights Approach to Development, 23 HuM. RTS. Q. 1005, 1010 (2001); N.J.
Udombana, The Third World and the Right to Development: Agenda for the Next Millennium, 22
HUM. RTS. Q. 753, 755-57 (2000); and Theo Van Boven, supra, at 126-27.
42. See Baehr, supra note 5, at 43. Sometimes this point assumes an ambivalent dimension
with repressive regimes arguing that they cannot allow basic civil and political rights in their
states as long as the population is underfed and economically underdeveloped. The
implication is that the satisfaction of civil and political rights is also dependent on economic
development.
43. See D'Sa, supra note 7, at 114 (internal citations omitted).
44. Minasse Haile, Human Rights in Africa: Observations on the Implication of Economic
Priority, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 300-01 (1986); see also Richard Gittleman, The African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 667, 687 (1982)
(asserting that the realities of African economic development render ESCR merely
"promotional and not protective."); U.O. Umozurike, The Significance of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, in PERSPECTiVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 44, 48 (Awa U. Kalu & Yemi
Osinbajo eds., 1992) (claiming that African states cannot guarantee a right to work).
45. UMOZURIKE, supra note 29, at 110. Indeed there are a number of studies demonstrating
that economic development has a strong, positive impact on the fulfillment of basic human
needs. Han Park has revealed that economic development is the strongest predictor of
improved basic needs achievement. Han S. Park, Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies,
9 HUM. RTS. Q. 405, 410-13 (1987); see also Bruce E. Moon & William J. Dixon, Politics, the State,
and Basic Human Needs: A Cross National Study, 29 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 661, 689-90 (1985). While
economic development may be the strongest predictor of the ability to fulfill basic needs, it
does not follow that basic needs are actually met, as events in the industrialized countries
have shown. See Noam Chomsky, supra note 3, at 33-40.
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Tanzania) .46
African states are, no doubt, among the most impoverished states of
the world. This fact makes the argument that they are too poor to realize
ESCR very compelling. However, these oft-invoked arguments usually
proceed from two interrelated yet erroneous and misleading suppositions.
First, they presuppose that ESCR are resource-intensive and require the
direct intervention of governments, whereas civil and political rights do
not involve government expenditure but merely entail the government's
forbearance from interfering with the rights of the people.47 Second, they
presuppose that African states' underdevelopment is enough to justify
non-enforcement of ESCR but not civil and political rights.
The African Charter does not impose separate or more onerous
obligations on States Parties with respect to ESCR. 48  The Charter's
provisions on these rights are modest. The right to an education, for
instance, does not impose a more resource-intensive obligation than the
right to a fair trial. Should a state then be justified in not providing
necessary medical or educational facilities, but not in failing to provide the
46. See CAMEROON CONST. (1972-1996); LESOTHO CONST. (1993); LIBER. CONST. (1984);
MALAWi CONST. (1994); NAMIB. CONST. (1990); NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria 1999); SIERRA LEONE CONST. (1991). The Constitutions of Ethiopia (1996),
Ghana (1979), Somalia (1979), and Uganda (1995) also contain declaratory socio-economic
rights, while the constitutions of Comoros (1992), Cote D'Ivoire (1990), Djibouti (1992), The
Gambia (1987), Mauritania (1991), Togo (1992), Zambia (1991), and Zimbabwe (1980-2000), do
not contain social rights provisions at all. I am grateful to Solomon Ukhuegbe for calling my
attention to and supplying the foregoing information.
47. See Marc Bossuyt, La distinction entre les droits civils et politiques et les droits economiques,
sociaux et cuturels, 8 HUM. RIS. J. 783 (1975) (arguing that civil and political rights require non-
interference on the part of the state (in the sense of being cost-free) while ESCR require active
intervention by the state (in the sense of being cost-intensive)); E.W. Vierdag, The Nature of
Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 NETH. Y.B.
INT'L L. 69, 103 (1978) (asserting that because ESCR are resource-intensive, their
implementation should properly be a political matter and not a matter of law or rights); see
also D. M. Davis, The Case Against the Inclusion of Socio-Economic Demands in a Bill of Rights
Except as Directive Principles, 8 S. AFR. J. HuM. RTS. 475, 478 (1992) (arguing that a social or
economic right imposes a duty upon the state to provide certain resources, unlike civil and
political rights that require a mere 'non-interference' from the state). These sources suffer
from inherent non-recognition of the true cost implications of protecting civil and political
rights. In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1996 (10) BCLR
1253 (CC) at 1289, I E-F, the South African Constitutional Court, in response to the claim
that the enforcement of socio-economic (as opposed to civil and political) rights must be
dependent on the capacity of a state to afford the cost, stated:
It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may result in courts
making orders that have direct implications for budgetary matters.
However, even when a court enforces civil and political rights such as
equality, freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, the order it makes
will often have such implications. A court may require the provision of
legal aid, or the extension of state benefits to a class of people who were
formerly not beneficiaries of such benefits.
Id. For a more detailed rebuttal of the resource intensive argument, see Shedrack C.
Agbakwa, Retrieving the Rejected Stone: Rethinking the Marginalization of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 45-56 (2000)
(unpublished LL.M. Thesis, Dalhousie Law School) (on file with author).
48. See Carlson Anyangwe, Obligations of States Parties to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, 10 REVUE AFRICAINE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET CoMIARI 625, 642 (1998).
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necessary machinery for law enforcement, fair trials, or dignified prison
conditions? 49
If the reason for marginalizing the enforcement of ESCR is a lack of
development, how does the state intend to develop if the overwhelming
majority of its citizens remains illiterate? A report to U.N.E.S.C.O.
underscores that "[n]ational development hinges on the ability of working
populations to handle complex technologies and to demonstrate
inventiveness and adaptability, qualities that depend to a great extent on
the level of initial education." 50 Accordingly, the realization of the right to
education and other ESCR are, as Hercules Booysen observes, "a
prerequisite for the creation of wealth" 51 and, as such, a necessary
precondition of development.5 2
Even if under-development is such a potent factor, it merely affects the
extent to which these rights can be realized and does not justify outright
non-enforcement. Under-development does not justify partial enforcement
any more than poverty justifies parents consistently feeding one child to
the neglect of their other children. In any case, it is well-known that, but
49. One scholar argues forcefully that:
If judges decide that no one may be imprisoned without fair trial, and
therefore that an order of habeas corpus must issue to secure the release
of a person detained without trial, the effect is to burden the state with
massive costs of a criminal justice system. The effect is to require the state
to pay the salaries of judges, prosecutors and their administrative staff, to
build court houses, and much more.... It is true, of course, that judicial
protection of personal liberty does not expressly compel the state to
commit resources. The state could instead refrain from prosecuting; but
that would put it in breach of its duty to maintain peaceful order, and in a
prospering society this option is in any event not a real possibility.
Judicial protection of personal liberty consequently makes considerable
expenditure inevitable.
Etienne Mureinik, Beyond A Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTs. 464, 466 (1992); see also J. Oloka-Onyango, Human Rights and Sustainable Development
in Contemporary Africa: A New Dawn, or Retreating Horizons?, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 57
(2000) (arguing that "certain obligations with respect to the realization of the rights such as
education, health, and shelter cannot simply be evaded by the state, irrespective of the
question of resources or financial ability").
50. See REPORT TO U.N.E.S.C.O. OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON EDUCATION FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE TREASURE WITHIN (Odile Jacob ed., 1996), quoted in
Mustapha Mehedi, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Realization of the
Right to Education, Including Education in Human Rights, Working Paper Presented to the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. ESCOR, 50th
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.N.4/Sub.2/1998/10 (1998), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrameld7ebdbb5988e7cl8O25664200
51e693?Opendocument (last visited Feb. 2, 2002); see also Henry J. Steiner, Social Rights and
Economic Development: Converging Discourses?, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 25, 37 (1998).
51. Hercules Booysen, The Dilemma of International Economic Human Rights: Their
Improvement Through an Integrated System Approach, 23 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 93, 109 (1998); see
also Hans-Otto Sano, Development and Human Rights: The Necessary, but Partial Integration of
Human Rights and Development, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 734, 749 (2000) (positing that ESCR are most
relevant to the target groups of development); Van Boven, supra note 41, at 127 (noting that
"human rights is an ingredient of the development process").
52. This much is implied in art. 1(1) of the U.N. General Assembly Declaration on the Right
to Development, supra note 41. See Skogly, supra note 41, at 753-54.
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for the poor administration and kleptomaniacal tendencies of their rulers,
many African states might have attained a level where basic survival needs
are met.5 3 As it is, most African rulers are richer than their states54 and
continue to squander available resources. Thus, "it is not [necessarily]
scarcity (of resources) which is the first problem, but maldistribution" 55 or
inequitable "allocation of resources... [and] provision of government
controlled benefits." 56 As Richard Falk argues, "[available] research
strongly suggests that most Third World countries possess the resources to
eliminate poverty and satisfy basic human needs if their policy makers
were so inclined."5 7
Although Richard Falk's point may be overstated (even rich Western
countries have not eliminated poverty in spite of their huge resources), its
import is instructive. The commonly asserted under-development of
African states is not "something akin to an original state of nature."
58
Conditions in many African states today arise not out of a lack of
wherewithal to satisfy the socio-economic rights of the people to a
minimum of human dignity. Rather, they are partly the direct consequence
of an active process of impoverishment 59 and de-development. In some
cases, international loans and grants purportedly secured to provide
essential facilities have ended up lining private pockets, securing safe nests
for the advantaged class or being spent to protect that class from the ire of
the dispossessed, all in the name of development and security.6° It is
53. Basic survival needs in this context "refer[] to the minimum requirements for
sustaining physical life, that is, health, food, housing, clothing, work, literacy." Richard Falk,
supra note 21, at 225; see also Frances Stewart, Basic Needs Strategies, Human Rights, and the Right
to Development, 11 HuM. RTS. Q. 347, 351 (1989).
54. One scholar writes that the late Mobutu Sese Sekou wa Zabanga of Zaire (now
Democratic Republic of Congo) "is believed to have amassed a fortune far in excess of his
country's national debt, bankrupting what must be one of the richest nations on the
continent." Onyango, supra note 6, at 3. Zaire (DRC) has a host of mineral riches, including
extensive reserves of gold, diamond, copper, cobalt, and zinc.
55. Tucker, supra note 18, at 162, n.226.
56. Minasse Haile, Human Rights, Stability, and Development in Africa: Some Observations on
Concept and Reality, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 575, 578 (1984). There is a widespread tendency among
many governments particularly in developing countries not to make the best available use of
resources for improving the general living conditions of their people. See Yoko Yokota,
Reflections on the Future of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs 201, 215 (Bums H. Weston & Stephen P. Marks eds., 1999)
("Instead, they often misallocate their scarce resources for unnecessarily large military
expenditure and personal luxury, and waste them also by corrupt practices.").
57. See Falk, supra note 21, at 225; see also Graciela Chichilnisky, Development Patterns and
the International Order, 31 J. INT'L AFF. 275 (1977); U.N.D.P., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1990, at 4 (1990) (stating that "[dieveloping countries are not too poor to pay for human
development and take care of economic growth," and listing some factors -including
disoriented national priorities, debt repayments, very high military spending, inefficient
parastatals, and unnecessary government controls-inhibiting the realization of human
development in developing countries).
58. George Kent, Globalization and Food Security in Africa, at
http://www2.hawaii.edu/-kent/globaFeb99.html (last visited Feb. 2,2002).
59. Id.
60. For these reasons, Skogly, supra note 41, at 753, relying on U.N.D.P., supra note 57, at
128-60, writes, "It is now widely recognized that assistance towards economic development
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unconscionable for those who participate in the squandering of
developmental opportunities to point to the conditions they create as
grounds for marginalizing enforcement of ESCR.
If an enforceable system of ESCR had been in place, it might have
provided an opportunity to challenge the government's priorities and to
hold it accountable for the expenditure of international loans. The
Nigerian government recently awarded a $350 million contract (with
another $6 million paid to foreign consultants) for an Olympic-size stadium
in Abuja. 61 During the same period, resident doctors and university
teachers across the country were on a prolonged strike over irregular or
non-payment of salaries and allowances. 62 The government's priorities
seem highly questionable for a country with more than five world-class
stadiums and an infrastructure (water supplies, electricity, health facilities
and schools) in shambles.63 Under a regime of enforceable ESCR, the
money for the stadium project might have been directed to health care,
education or the acute housing shortage in the capital city, where it would
have made a significant difference.
Under a robust regime of ESCR, accountability for such expenditures
would likely improve policies and the quality of governance. As Etienne
Mureinik argues:
a decision maker who is aware in advance of the risk of being
required to justify a decision will always consider it more closely
than if there were no risk. A decision maker alive to that risk is
under pressure consciously to consider and meet all the objections,
consciously to consider and thoughtfully to discard all the
alternatives, to the decision contemplated. And if in court the
government could not offer a plausible justification for the
programme that it had chosen... then the programme would have
to be struck down.64
does not necessarily improve income distribution, education, or health for the majority of
people in Africa."
61. See Samuel Udeala, NLC Faults FG over N38bn Abuja Stadium Contract, VANGUARD
(Lagos), July 19, 2001, at
http://www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles/2001/July/19072001/b119O7O1.htm (last
visited Feb. 2, 2002).
62. See Rotimi Ajayi, FG Moves To End Doctors' Strike, VANGUARD (Lagos), June 14, 2001, at
http://www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles/2001/june/14/nationallO614111651.htm (last
visited Feb. 2, 2002).
63. See Karl Maier, Nigeria: Hope After 40 Years, B.B.C. NEWS ONLINE, Oct. 1, 2000, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid- 949000/949021.stm (last visited
Feb. 2, 2002); see also U.N. Comm. on ESCR, Concluding Observations on the Report of Nigeria, at
para. 28, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.23 (1998) (noting with concern "that gross under-funding
and inadequate management of health services led during the last decade to rapid
deterioration of health infrastructures in hospitals.").
64. Mureinik, supra note 49, at 471-72. According to Mureinik, the court might intervene
to quash legislation that created fourteen departments of health if it found multiple
bureaucracies to be a senseless squandering of precious resources. The court might also
intervene "if the annual Budget appropriated funds to build a replica of St. Peter's, [as
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In this sense, the lack of an enforceable regime of ESCR may itself
impede development. A government that is not required to justify its
socio-economic policies and priorities is not likely to develop a consistent
policy that encourages wise investments and conserves resources necessary
for sustainable development.
One cannot deny the reality of Africa's grim economic situation, which
remains a significant constraint on the financial abilities of African states.
Although blame is often placed on this economic situation, the lack of
political will and the corruption of the ruling elite have also played a large
role in preventing an equal emphasis on enforcement of ESCR as of civil
and political rights. Where African states have taken steps to enforce
ESCR, they have not been negatively affected by it. The introduction of a
regime of judicially enforceable ESCR in South Africa 65 has not paralyzed
the state developmentally. 66 Yet, South Africa is not endowed with vastly
greater resources than some African states with non-enforceable ESCR.
Enforcing ESCR can lead to social and political stability. Two recent
South African decisions on ESCR67 may have averted a breakdown in law
and order that could have led to land invasions (occupations) like those in
Zimbabwe-a result that would have threatened investment and
development.
Under-development has not affected "[slervices which are of concern
to the richer and more powerful sections of the society--such as...
prestige development projects," 68 nor induced cuts in military spending.69
The fact that governments pour money into such projects makes it clear
that underdevelopment is a smokescreen for a lack of political will to
enforce ESCR.
Rather than blaming the existing lack of development for non-
Houphet Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire did], or perhaps a nuclear submarine before the rights of
education promised by the constitution had been delivered." Id. at 472.
65. The Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution provides for justiciable ESCR,
including rights to housing, health care, food, water, social security, education, a safe
environment, and the right to form, join, and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic
associations, as well as children's rights to basic nutrition, shelter, health care and social
services. S. AFR. CONsT. (1996), §§ 24, 26-29, 31.
66. The point here is not that the existence of justiciable ESCR, by itself, necessarily
guarantees their automatic enjoyment or that the courts will deliver these rights in every case.
As in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SALR 765 (CC), the courts may
still be reluctant to grant every prayer. In Soobramoney, the Court declined to compel the
provision of dialysis treatment for a sick patient because of the state's insufficient resources.
Nevertheless, the availability of judicial review (or other independent review) can be a
significant weapon in the hands of the oppressed and may provide occasions for appropriate
judicial intervention. See, for example, the landmark Grootboom v. Oostenberg Municipality
2000 (3) BCLR 277 (SA) and its analysis by Craig Scott & Philip Alston in Adjudicating
Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney's Legacy and
Grootboom's Promise, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 206 (2000).
67. See South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); Minister of Public Works v.
Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association, 2001 (7) BCLR 652 (CC).
68. See U.N.I.C.E.F., THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 16 (1989); see also Akankwasa,
supra note 30, at 113 (describing the Ugandan government's eviction of "peasants" from their
land to make way for a prestigious national park project).
69. See U.N.D.P., supra note 57, at 4.
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enforcement of ESCR, responsible leaders should address the other, more
dominant obstacles to the realization of ESCR in Africa. Some of these
obstacles also prevent future development and underlie the under-
development critique. The next section discusses some of these factors.
III. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS
The obstacles to the realization and enforcement of ESCR under the
African Charter include a combination of internal, textual factors and
external, contextual factors. The internal factors stem from the normative
flaws of the Charter's provisions on ESCR. The external factors include the
host of political, economic and historical forces that prevent States Parties
from fulfilling their ESCR obligations under the Charter. This article does
not attempt to address comprehensively all the impediments to
enforcement of ESCR in Africa. Many important factors-such as the
effects of the Cold War,70 slavery and colonialism 71 - are mentioned either
briefly or not at all in favor of focusing on more recent, less developed
factors.
A. Content and Scope of African Charter Provisions on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights
The normative inadequacies of the African Charter, particularly the
provisions on ESCR, are well-known. 72
One serious obstacle to the enforcement of the Charter's provisions on
ESCR is their lack of conceptual clarity. The Charter's failure to define
ESCR adequately is not unique among international instruments.
Nonetheless, the vagueness of ESCR makes enforcement quite difficult. 73
70. For a brief insight into the atrocities of the Cold War, see Adebayo Adedei,
Comprehending African Conflicts, supra note 23, at 9-10.
71. The role of slavery and colonialism in the economic exploitation and cultural
domination of Africa has been sufficiently set out elsewhere. See generally WALTER RODNEY,
How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA (1981); WALTER RODNEY, WEST AFRICA AND THE
ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE (1967); Adam Hochschild, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST: A STORY OF
GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1998); PHILIP CURTIN, DEATH BY
MIGRATION: EUROPE'S ENCOUNTER WITH THE TROPICAL WORLD IN THE 19TH CENTURY (1989).
72. See generally Makau Mutua, The Afican Human Rights Court: A Two Legged Stool?, 21
HUm. RmS. Q. 342 (1999); Makau wa Mutua, The Afican Human Rights System in a Comparative
Perspective, 3 REV. AFR. COMM. HUM. & PEOPLES' RTs. 5 (1993); Onyango, supra note 6, at 51;
D'Sa, supra note 7, at 113-15; George W. Mugwanya, Realizing Universal Human Rights Norms
Through Regional Human Rights Mechanisms: Reinvigorating the African System, 10 IND. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 35 (1999); Wolfgang Benedek, The African Charter and Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights: How to Make it More Effective, 11 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 25 (1993).
73. See BRIG1T C. A. TOEBES, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 6 (1999); Yokota, supra note 56, at 205-06; Brigit Toebes, Towards an Improved
Understanding of the International Human Right to Health, 21 HuM. RTS. Q. 661, 661-62 (1999);
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The Charter's provision on the right to health74 is typical. It entitles
individuals to enjoy "the best attainable state of physical and mental
health" without prescribing the standard of health75 or defining what is
meant by "the best attainable state." Given this ambiguity, the Charter's
right to health depends on how a state construes it. A reasonable
interpretation is that it imposes an unlimited obligation to provide free
medical services, which leads to the frustrating conclusion that "[e]ven if
governments employ the services of modern doctors as well as traditional
healers, it seems quite impossible for them to carry out the obligation." 76
The provision's ambiguity allows states to avoid this interpretation. For
both the individual and the state, the provision provides little guidance as
to the state's obligation and the individual's appropriate expectations. As
with its correlate in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Charter's right to health needs to be better
defined. 77
B. Lack of Effective Enforcement and Promotion
The absence of effective promotion and enforcement at the agency
level also impedes the realization of ESCR under the Charter. The
vagueness problem discussed in the section above might have been
alleviated through an African agency's better enforcement or promotion of
ESCR. However, this has not happened until recently. After a long period
during which the African Commission did not bother with ESCR78, it
appears to be gradually changing its attitude.79 Yet, as Makau Mutua
74. "(1) Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical
and mental health; (2) State Parties to the present Charter shall take necessary measures to
protect the health of their people and ensure that they receive medical attention when they are
sick." Ar. Charter, supra note 2, art. 16.
75. Umozurike, supra note 44, at 48.
76. Id.
77. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). For an
attempt to clarify the scope and implications of the right to health under the ICESCR, see
Toebes, supra note 73. Gomez, supra note 73, at 161, argues that "[giving clarity and content
to these standards [or rights] is one of the major tasks awaiting the human rights movement."
Similar ambiguities surround other ESCR provisions of the Charter. The right to education
under article 17(1) is ambiguous. It provides that, "Every individual shall have the right to
education." The right to work under article 15 entitles individuals to "work under equitable
and satisfactory conditions" and to "receive equal pay for equal work." The ambiguity allows
States Parties to deny any obligation to provide jobs, to initiate measures to create jobs, or to
recognize any rights of the unemployed.
78. In 1988, shortly after the Commission came into being, former Chairman Umozurike
disclosed that the Commission had decided to concentrate on civil and political rights. He
claimed that the Commission would be overwhelmed with cases if it attempted to make ESCR
an immediate priority. See U. Oji Umozurike, The Protection of Human Rights Under the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1 AFR. J. INT'L L. 62, 81 (1988).
79. The Commission has dealt with ESCR in several recent communications. See
Pagnoulle (on behalf of Mazou) v. Cameroon, Communication No. 39/90 (1997), reported in 6
HUM. RTS. REP. 819 (1999) (holding that the failure of Cameroon to reinstate Mazou, a
magistrate, who had been unlawfully detained and removed from his former position,
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notes, the Commission's decisions and pronouncements have been merely
"formulaic": they "do not reference jurisprudence from national and
international tribunals, nor do they fire the imagination."8 0 Chidi Odinkalu
asserts that the Commission has been successfully addressing the
deficiencies of the Charter "through its practice, evolving procedures, and
jurisprudence." 8 ' When it comes to ESCR provisions, it is difficult to accept
this assertion without some skepticism. The Commission has yet to
address the Charter's ESCR-related normative deficiencies in any
significant way. The Commission cannot be wholly dismissed "as a
worthless institution." 82  It certainly is not. The Commission has
commendably earned itself a place in the international human rights
firmament. Yet, as far as ESCR is concerned, the Commission, although not
entirely a sham, is still much less than a savior.
Both in promotion and enforcement, the Commission has concentrated
its efforts mainly on civil and political rights to the detriment of ESCR. In
fairness to the Commission, it can only entertain cases brought before it.
The Commission does not have a mandate to be a knight errant in shining
armor initiating cases on behalf of helpless victims. However, one of its
primary mandates, as stipulated in Article 45(1)(a) of the Charter, is to
"undertake studies and researches on African problems in the field of
human and peoples' rights, organize seminars, symposia and conferences,
disseminate information, encourage national and local institutions
concerned with human and peoples' rights ... "83 The dearth of cases on
ESCR is due in part to the Commission's inadequate efforts to encourage
such cases and to educate and sensitize people as to their rights. Given its
broad mandate, the Commission has a responsibility to ensure respect and
observance of provisions of the Charter, without exception. If the
constituted a violation of the right to work under article 15 of the Charter); Media Rights
Agenda v. Nigeria, Communication Nos. 105/93, 128/94, 130/94 and 152/96 (1998), reported
in 7 INVL HuM. RTS. REP. 265 (2000) (consolidating various cases against the Nigerian
government and holding that denying a detainee access to doctors while his health
deteriorates violates the right to health), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/12thannex5.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2002);
International Pen v. Nigeria, Communication Nos. 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97 (1998),
reported in 7 INT'L HUM. RTS. REP. 274 (2000) (consolidating several cases brought before the
Commission concerning Ken Saro-Wiwa and co-defendants and holding that the Charter
requires State Parties to provide detainees access to medical care), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/12thannex5.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2002); see also
World Organisation Against Torture v. Zaire, Communication Nos. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91,
100/93 (1996), reported in 4 HuM. RTS. REP. 89 (1997) (consolidating cases that, "taken together,
showed evidence of serious or massive violations of human rights in Zaire" and holding the
Zairean government's failure to ensure its citizens a minimum standard of health care
constituted a violation of article 16 of the Charter), available at
http://www.up.ac.za/chr/ahrdb/acomn decisions.htm#25/89 (last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
80. Mutua, African Human Rights Court, supra note 72, at 348.
81. Chidi Odinkalu, The Individual Complaints Procedures of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights: A Preliminary Assessment, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNTEMP. PROB. 359,
398 (1998). For a similar view, see Gino Naldi, Reparations in the Practice of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 681, 693 (2001).
82. Id. at 402.
83. Afr. Charter, supra note 2, art. 45(1).
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Commission excels in its broad promotional mandate, it will face a deluge
of ESCR cases. It remains to be seen if the newly created African Court on
Human Rights84 will be more successful in promoting and protecting
ESCR. In the absence of effective promotion, individuals are less likely to
assert their rights, no matter how clearly they are expressed.
C. Inept and Corrupt Leadership
It is a truism that the destiny of a people is tied to the quality of its
leadership. Colonialism left Africa and Africans socio-economically
battered. However, the ineptitude and corruption of certain past and
present African leaders have worsened the socio-economic woes of the
continent. 85 As George Kent argues, "[s]ome [African states] have had
corrupt governments that exploited their own people as viciously as any
outsiders have ever done." 86 Corruption is hardly unique to Africa, but
some African states have elevated it to an art form worthy of its own
national museum. Resources that should have been utilized to provide
basic facilities have been filched and transferred into the private Western
bank accounts of high-ranking African leaders and officials.87 Less directly,
corrupt leaders steal by rejecting policies that would better spur
development and promote ESCR in favor of policies that bring greater
profits their way through businesses, investments, or unscrupulous
cohorts. The interests of the people are pursued only to the extent that they
coincide with the selfish interests of those in power. Corruption leads to
84. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 9, 1998,
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (Ill) not yet in force, reprinted in 6 INT'L HUM. RTS. REP. 891
(1999). For an analysis of the Protocol and the history of the creation of the Court, see
Nsongurua J. Udombana, Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: Better Late
Than Never, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45 (2000), available at http://www.yale.edu/yhrdlj/;
Mutua, African Human Rights Court, supra note 72; Ibrahim Ali Baldwi El-Sheik, Draft Protocol
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights: Introductory Note, 9 REVUE AFRICAINE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL ET
COMARt 943 (1997); Gino J. Naldi & Konstantinos Magliveras, The Proposed African Court of
Human and Peoples' Rights: Evaluation and Comparison, 8 REVUE AFRIcAINE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL ET COMPARt 944 (1996). Only three states (Burkina Faso, Gambia and
Senegal) have ratified the Protocol; eight more are needed to bring the Protocol into force. For
the status of ratification, see http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ratz2afchr.html (last
visited Feb. 2, 2002).
85. See Robert I. Rotberg, Africa's Mess, Mugabe's Mayhem, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 47 (2000).
86. Kent, supra note 58.
87. For instance, a former Nigerian military head of state, the late General Sani Abacha, is
believed to have stashed away billions of dollars in foreign accounts. See Pres. Olusegun
Obasanjo, How We Fared in the Last One Year, Broadcast Address on the One Year
Anniversary of Civil Rule, May 29, 2000, VANGUARD (Lagos); Umozurike, supra note 29, at 48
(characterizing Abacha's corruption as "a high-ranking cause of underdevelopment, resulting
in malnutrition, lack of healthcare and other deprivations."); see also Afe Babalola, Legal and
Judicial System and Corruption, in AFRICA LEADERSHIP FORUM: CORRUPTION, DEMOCRACY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN WEST AFRICA 93-94 (1994); Onyango, supra note 6, at 3 (noting how
Mobutu's "corruption and vice directly impinged upon the people of Zaire's economic and
social rights to adequate health care, sufficient food and appropriate shelter.").
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infringement of civil and political rights as well. Those emboldened
enough to call for accountability and transparency in the conduct of public
affairs are designated "security risks" or enemies of the "people" and
become targets for incarceration or worse.88
African corruption could not thrive on its own. Corrupt rulers receive
significant outside support. As the Igbos of Nigeria say, when a person is
dancing alone at the center of the road, his drummers must be somewhere
nearby in the bush. The Cold War era stands out as a period of extensive
outside support for repressive regimes and the propping up of corrupt
rulers throughout Africa. The effects of this pernicious ideological
wrangling can still be felt in Mozambique, Eritrea, Angola, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), among others. Adebayo
Adedeji calls Somalia and Ethiopia "two... unfortunate examples of the
havoc of the Cold War." 89
The Cold War also ensured the continued influx of external loans to
many African rulers despite their known distinction in mismanagement.
As the next section reveals, the servicing of these (sometimes spurious)
debts continues to take a significant toll on the funding of public services
such as health and education.90
D. Debt and Structural Adjustment
Many African states, like other developing countries, are overburdened
with heavy debts. Debt burdens are major obstacles to meaningful
economic development in those states and contribute to non-enforcement
of ESCR.91 According to the 1992 U.N.D.P. Human Development Report,
from "1983-89, rich creditors received a staggering [$1242 billion [dollars] in
net transfers on long term lending from indebted developing countries."92
The greatest impact of this transfer, according to George Kent, "is in sub-
Saharan Africa where the debt load is approximately equal to the region's
cumulative gross national product."93
88. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1996, at 7, 34-36
(1995) (documenting accounts of suppression of freedom of expression of government critics
in Nigeria); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1999, at 236-37
(1999) (describing the repression of freedom of expression in Liberia following criticisms of
the government's handling of public affairs).
89. Adedeji, supra note 23, at 9-10. Adedeji argues that American support for Siad Barre's
suppression of Somalians sowed the seed of the country's disintegration. The United States
also scuttled several attempts to overthrow Mobutu Sese Sekou, who is believed to have
amassed a fortune far in excess of his country's national debt. The Soviets' support allowed
Mengistu Haile Mariam to decimate the Ethiopian people. Id.
90. See B.B.C. News Online, Overdrawn: The Developing World's Debt Crisis, April 28, 1999,
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/newsid_140000/140581.stm (last visited Feb. 2,
2002).
91. See Guiss6, supra note 4, at para. 54.
92. U.N.D.P., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992, at 45 (1992). The report also noted
yearly debt-related net transfers of $50 billion from developing to industrial countries up to
1992.
93. Kent, supra note 58. In some cases, the loans are "misappropriated by those
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This situation has led to debt crises in these states, necessitating the
current call for alleviation or- renegotiation of their debts. Servicing these
debts,94 some of which are "merely a series of fictitious operations bringing
no benefit to the populations concerned, which they are nevertheless called
on to repay,"9 5 greatly incapacitates the states involved. They also
undermine the prospects of the affected states to provide even the most
basic facilities needed to meet ESCR obligations. Debt servicing has had
"especially negative impacts on the poor and their children, obliging them
to do without food subsidies and health and other services, and often
pressing them into exploitative working conditions." % This devastating
impact is not mitigated by international development assistance, because,
as George Kent notes,
[tlhe amount of money going from the [S]outh to the [N]orth for
debt servicing greatly exceeds the current amounts of official
development assistance going from the [N]orth to the [S]outh.
Moreover, official development aid is likely to benefit the rich and
the middle class rather than the poor . . . [since it] does not
concentrate on the most needy either within countries or among
countries. 97
Under the dual burden of debt and evaporating aid, many African
states were goaded into adopting the structural adjustment policies 98 of the
International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) and World Bank. These policies
appear to have worsened their economic circumstances. 99 These states
responsible for managing them, to be redeposited in the banks of the creditor countries or
reinvested in companies in those same countries." Guisss, supra note 4, at para 57.
94. Nigeria currently spends $3.5 billion (more than 40 percent of its 2000 budget)
annually to service its debt burden of about $33 billion. See Laolu Akande, Ahead Visit, Clinton
Begins Debt-Pardon Crusade for Nigeria, THE GUARDIAN (Lagos), July 13, 2000.
95. GuissL, supra note 4, at para 57.
96. Kent, supra note 58.
97. Id.; see also Yemi Osinbajo & Olukonyisola Ajayi, Human Rights and Economic
Development in Developing Countries, 28 INT'L LAW. 727, 731 (1994). Strikingly, it has been
reported that the "I.M.F. took £390m more out of Africa than it put in, in 1997" and that for
every £1 given in aid by the West, £3 goes back to it as debt repayment. B.B.C. NEWS ONLINE,
supra note 90.
98. Structural adjustment has been defined as "reforms of policies and institutions
covering micro-economic (such as taxes and tariffs), macro-economic (fiscal policy) and
institutional interventions-these are changes designed to improve resource allocation,
increase economic efficiency, expand growth potential and increase resilience to shocks."
WORLD BANK, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND POVERTY: A CONCEPTUAL, EMPIRICAL AND
POLICY FRAMEWORK 22 (1990), cited in SKOGLY, supra note 41, at 755. According to Skogly,
"[t]he premise of structural adjustment conditions is that certain economic factors should be
altered in a given country to ensure better economic performance with a view to repay debt
and debt servicing, to achieve a better balance of payment situation, and to achieve a healthier
economy in general." Id. at 756. See also Caroline Thomas, International Financial Institutions
and Social and Economic Human Rights: An Exploration, in HUMAN RIGHTS FIFTY YEARS ON, supra
note 3, at 167 (noting that "[tihere was an unspoken agreement that adjustment and debt
repayment would be rewarded by inflows of new finance and investment.").
99. See Osinbajo & Ajayi, supra note 97, at 731.
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have had to reduce their imports, devalue their currencies, deregulate
capital movements, privatize state public utilities, dismantle social
programs by cutting government expenditures on social services, such as
health care, education and removal of subsidies on market staples, and
provide "national treatment" to foreign investors.100 "These provisions,"
according to Michel'Chossudovsky, "are often coupled with a 'bankruptcy
programme' under the supervision of the World Bank with a view to
triggering the liquidation of competing national enterprises," 101 with the
obvious "loss of indigenous control of critical areas of the economy." The
adjustments culminate in severely austere measures that unleash sweeping
pauperization on the majority of people and "a severe deterioration in the
abilities of these countries to uphold the economic and social rights of their
peoples."102
The obvious impact of structural adjustment programs is to reduce the
capacity of the states to meet their human rights obligations.1°3 In Africa
and elsewhere, structural adjustment programs adversely affect not only
ESCR, but also civil and political rights.14 As Yemi Osinbajo and
100. See Kent, supra note 58 ; see also Michel Chossudovsky, World Trade Organisation
(INTO): An Illegal Organisation that Violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, HUM. RTS.
ARTICLES (Derechos Human Rights, N.G.O.), at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/doc/articulos/chossudovskye.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2002).
101. Chossudovsky, supra note 100.
102. Osinbajo & Ajayi, supra note 97, at 731. Zimbabwe used to provide free education for
all until adherence to an I.M.F. structural adjustment program brought it to an end. See Maria
Nzomo, The Political Economy of the African Crisis: Gender Impacts and Responses 51 INT'L J. 78
(1996); Bharati Sadasivam, The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Women: A Governance and
Human Rights Agenda, 19 HUM. RTs. Q. 630, 641 (1996); see also, J. Oloka-Onyango, Poverty,
Human Rights and the Questfor Sustainable Human Development in Structurally-Adjusted Uganda,
18 NETH. Q. HUM. RTs. 23, 24 (2000). Onyango elsewhere explains:
In more specific ways, structural adjustment affects working conditions
and the right to work through retrenchment as a result of
deindigenization, privatisation and the liberalization of trade controls.
The extent of available health care and its costs is severely affected by the
introduction (as in Zimbabwe) of user fees, which is an additional burden
on people who are already impoverished and exist largely in a
subsistence economy. The nature of educational services and their
accessibility is affected by the increase in fees for tuition .... Finally, the
ability to provide food and combat poverty is affected by the overall
concentration on export crops and removal of subsidies for market
staples.
Onyango, supra note 6, at 27.
103. See Lawrence Tshuma, The Impact of I.M.F./World Bank Dictated Economic Structural
Adjustment Programmes on Human Rights: Erosion of Empowerment Rights, in THE
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 219, 227 (Pearson Nherere &
Marina d'Engelbronner-Kolff eds., 1993); see also Sigrun I. Skogly, Human Rights and Economic
Efficiency: The Relationship Between Social Cost of Adjustment and Human Rights Protection, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: YEARBOOK 1994, at 43-65 (Peter Baehr et al. eds.,
1994).
104. See Tshuma, supra note 103, at 230; see also Margaret Conklin & Daphne Davidson,
The I.M.F. and Economic and Social Human Rights: A Case Study ofArgentina, 1958-1985, 8 HUM.
RTS. Q. 227 (1986) (exploring the violations of all human rights following the adoption of
structural adjustment policies in Argentina).
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Olukonyisola Ajayi observe, "[flaced with standards of living well below
poverty levels, the citizenry has usually responded with strikes, rioting,
and other forms of dissent, which have almost always been met with
suppression by force or draconian legislation... ."105 Although the
structural adjustment policies are sold to states as the only way to improve
their economies and reduce their debt burdens10 6, the adjustment policies
have merely worsened the social and economic ruin in these countries.10 7
This led the U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur to
conclude that the adjustment policies "are actually means designed to
recover the sums owed to the wealthy countries without any concern for
the debtor countries."108 The debts have increased exponentially instead of
decreasing, 09 making the attempt at debt control and recovery an
undisguised "failure as blatant as it is significant."" 0
Structural adjustment promotes marginalization and deprivation of
ESCR by both worsening conditions and preventing states from
recognizing or enforcing ESCR. By its example, the imposition of these
policies devalues an ethos of accountability. External actors, who are not
accountable to the affected people, induce these measures.' Despite these
policies' track record of dehumanizing affected populations, many African
105. Osinbajo & Ajayi, supra note 97. In Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, and Zambia, the ruling
regimes resorted to repression to implement adjustment programs. See Tshuma, supra note
103, at 229. For the I.M.F.'s and World Bank's need for policies on accountability and human
rights, see Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the I.M.F., and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 47 (1996). It has been argued that women suffer most both from the
economic crisis and from the adjustment policies. See Christine Chinkin & Shelly Wright, The
Hunger Trap: Women, Food, and Self-Determination, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 262, 313 (1993); see also
Sadasivam, supra note 102.
106. See, e.g., Gerald Scott, Who Has Failed Africa?: I.M.F. Measures or the Aftican Leadership?
33 J. ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 265, 268-70 (1998) (arguing that I.M.F. programs are the most
effective available option for addressing Africa's economic woes). But see S. P. Schatz, The
World Bank's Fundamental Misconception in Africa, 34 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 239 (1996)
(demonstrating that, contrary to I.M.F./World Bank claims, the implementation of structural
adjustment most often causes poorer economic performance); S.P. Schatz, Structural Adjustment
in Africa: A Failing Grade So Far, 32 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 679 (1994) (same).
107. See Paul J. Kaiser, Structural Adjustment and the Fragile Nation: The Demise of Social
Unity in Tanzania, 34 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 227, 231-37 (1996) (linking the decay of social
cohesion in Tanzania to the introduction of structural adjustment).
108. Guiss(, supra note 4, at para. 66.
109. See Peter Baehr et al., HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: YEARBOOK 1996, at
394 (Peter Baehr et al. eds., 1996) (noting the exponential increase in the debt of Uganda since
its adoption of structural adjustment policies).
110. Guisst, supra note 4 , at para. 63. For a more detailed exploration of the impact and
failures of structural adjustment policies in Africa, see THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENTS ON THE POPULATION OF AFRICA (Aderanti Adepoju ed., 1993); CRISIS AND
ADJUSTMENT IN THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY (Adebayo Olkoshi ed., 1991); AUTHORITARIANISM,
DEMOCRACY AND ADJUSTMENT: THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN AFRICA (Peter Gibbon
et al. eds., 1992); THE POLITICS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN NIGERIA (Adebayo Olukoshi
ed., 1993).
111. See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Re-Conceiving "Third World" Legitimate Governance
Struggles in Our Time: Emergent Imperatives for Rights Activism, 6 BUFF. HUM. Rms. L. REV. 1, 1-
37 (2000) (demonstrating how international financial institutions have assumed an ever-
increasing share of Third World governance); see also Anne Orford, Locating the International:
Military and Monetary Interventions After the Cold War, 38 HARv. INT'L L.J. 443,451-60 (1997).
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states are still being goaded into accepting them as a condition for
rescheduling or cancellation of their debts.112 One is tempted to agree with
the suggestion that "perpetuating the debt of the developing countries is
the result of a deliberate and political decision designed solely to frustrate
any attempt by the developing countries and their peoples to achieve
economic and social progress."" 3 The fact that "countries that oppose the
measures suggested by the institutions (themselves agents of neo-colonial
interests) do not receive any financial assistance" 114 amply lends credence
to the suggestion. Just as debts and structural adjustments are vital
instruments sustaining the continued deprivation of ESCR of the people,
there are growing fears that globalization further exacerbate human
suffering and erosion of socio-economic rights." 5 Be that as it may, African
states' relative achievement in the enforcement of civil and political rights
shows that where the international will does exist greater achievements
will be made in the enforcement of ESCR.
E. International Apathy and Hostility
One of the greatest impediments to the enforcement and realization of
ESCR in Africa is the indifference - and even hostility - of the international
community towards enforceable ESCR. The most notable monument to
this attitude is the fact that the UDHR had to be translated into two
covenants instead of one. 116 Although lip service was paid to the notion of
ESCR during much of the Cold War, indifference and apathy towards
enforceable ESCR grew increasingly in the later years of the Cold War and
especially since the end of the Cold War.117 The end of the Cold War
deprived ESCR of the support of a superpower, the Soviet Union, on the
international stage. The demise of the Soviet Union was taken as the defeat
of an ideology that emphasizes ESCR and a victory for liberal ideology that
112. In 2000, U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers announced that the United States
would support Nigeria's bid for debt rescheduling only if Nigeria accepts the structural
adjustment policies of the I.M.F. and "manages to keep up with the terms of [the] program
with the International Monetary Fund." Stephen Fidler, Nigeria Wins U.S. Debt Backing,
FINANCIAL TIMES, June 12, 2000; see also Arthur Obayuwana, U.S. Links Support for Debt Relief to
I.M.F. Conditions, THE GUARDIAN (Lagos), June 13, 2000.
113. Guiss6, supra note 4, at para. 59.
114. Skogly, supra note 41, at 756.
115. There is ample scholarship addressing the negative impact of globalization on ESCR
in both developed and developing states. See generally MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE
GLOBALIZATION OF POVERTY: IMPACTS OF THE IMF AND WORLD BANK REFORMS (1997);
GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS (U. Mittleman ed., 1996); Robert McCorquodale &
Richard Fairbrother, Globalization and Human Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 735 (1999).
116. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALS 256-57 (2d ed. 1996).
117. But see Mugwanya, supra note 72, at 38 (celebrating the end of the Cold War as
having "liberated international efforts to promote human rights from ideological conflicts and
political sloganeering"). On the contrary, the end of the Cold War merely shifted ideological
battlefronts, making the war more covert and dangerous. The "victory" enthroned a
mentality of ideological victors and vanquished, making the "victors" more entrenched in
their ways to the detriment of ESCR enforcement.
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emphasizes civil and political rights to the exclusion of ESCR.
The supposed victory of liberalism led to the current "development
orthodoxy"" 8 based on economic and political liberalism, which is being
sold as the best method for maximizing global welfare.1 9 Yet, as Caroline
Thomas points out, "evidence of such a claim is lacking, resting largely on
the perceived absence of alternatives. [Per contra,] evidence against seems
to be mounting."120 Furthermore, "even the supporters of the neoliberal
market economics have had to admit its abysmal failure to assist the
world's poor"' 21 and improve the realization of ESCR.122 Despite all the
praises for the market system of wealth creation as the most effective that
humanity has yet devised, "it remains an imperfect force since two-thirds
of the world's population have gained little or no substantive advantage
from rapid economic growth. [Even] in the developed world, the lowest
quartile has witnessed trickle-up rather than trickle-down."' 23 Although
international markets may give little reason for hope, one cannot
underestimate the potency of external pressures on the overall
improvement of the human rights situation in Africa. 124 What these
influences have helped to achieve with respect to civil and political
rights- including entrenching those rights as enforceable under the
various constitutions -has not, however, been attempted with regard to
ESCR. Even prominent transnational human rights organizations have yet
to-rise fully to the occasion in the area of ESCR. 125 Thus, while perceived
118. Thomas, supra note 98, at 164.
119. Id.
120. Id; see also B. Crossette, U.N. Survey Finds World Rich-Poor Gap Widening, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 1996, at A3 (highlighting the global inequality which continues to characterize the
global social order).
121. Thomas, supra note 98, at 165.
122. See G. Lean & Y. Cooper, The Theory Was That as the Rich Got Richer We'd All Benefit.
But It Hasn't Worked, INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY, July 21, 1996, at 52-53.
123. Thomas, supra note 98, at 165 (notes and citations omitted). See also Donnelly, supra
note 16, at 630 (describing free markets as "an economic analog to a political system of
majority rule without minority rights").
124. Such external pressures include linking financial assistance to the human rights
records and performance of prospective recipient states. See Agbakwa, supra note 47, at 22-24;
Olusola Ojo & Amadu Sesay, The O.A.U. and Human Rights: Prospects for the 1980s and Beyond,
8 HuM. RTs. Q. 89, 92 (1986); UMOZURIKE, supra note 29, at 27; Amy Young-Anawety, Human
Rights and ACP-EEC Lome II Convention, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 63, 71-74 (1980).
125. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS ("Since
its formation in 1978, Human Rights Watch has focused mainly on upholding civil and
political rights, but in recent years we have increasingly addressed economic, social and
cultural rights as well.... We pay special attention to economic, social and cultural rights
violations when they result from violations of civil and political rights or must be remedied as
part of a plan for ending violations of civil and political rights."), at
http://www.hrw.org/esc/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2002); AMNsTY INTERNATIONAL, ABOUT A.I.
("Amnesty International is a worldwide campaigning movement that works to promote all
the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
international standards. In particular, Amnesty International campaigns to free all prisoners
of conscience; ensure fair and prompt trials for political prisoners; abolish the death penalty,
torture and other cruel treatment of prisoners; end political killings and "disappearances";
and oppose human rights abuses by opposition groups."), at
http://web.amnesty.org/web/aboutai.nsf (last visited Feb. 2, 2002). African and African-
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violations of civil and political rights give rise to a hue and cry, there is
usually only silence in the face of egregious violations of ESCR, thereby
creating the impression that no injustice has been done and emboldening
violators. With insufficient or no pressure on them, several governments
continue to deny the enforcement and justiciability of socio-economic
rights and to misuse funds. 126
Arguably, the efforts of some African states with respect to the
enforcement of civil and political rights would not have materialized
without the pressures of the international community -states, NGOs, and
civil society. It follows that similar efforts by the international community
with respect to ESCR might have achieved similar results in the
enforcement of ESCR. 127 However, most states either lack the moral high
ground to criticize other states about their respect for ESCR or will not do
so for ideological reasons. As a consequence, ESCR remain the province of
impunity. Moreover, developed states have successfully marketed at home
and abroad a mythology that ESCR are prohibitively expensive, convincing
less developed states that the path to economic wealth cannot include
enforceable ESCR.128
The hostility of some Western states to the notion of enforceable
ESCR129 reveals itself in their various tactics to undermine the efforts of
developing states moving in the direction of implementation or
enforcement of ESCR. This undermining takes place directly or by proxy,
through agents, multinational corporations, the World Trade Organization
(W.T.O.) or other international financial institutions.130 For instance, in the
based N.G.O.s have been, for the most part, as unconcerned in this regard as international
human rights organizations. This is unfortunate, for human rights are not given, they are
taken through struggle against the political elite. See Harry M. Scoble, Human Rights Non-
Governmental Organisations in Black Africa: Their Problems and Prospects in the Wake of the Banjul
Charter, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 177 (Claude E. Welch & Ronald I.
Meltzer eds., 1984).
126. See Ojo & Sesay, supra note 124, at 103 (noting the negative impact of the absence of
"potent pressure on African leaders in the way they treat their citizens"). See generally
Augustine Ikelegbe, Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria:
Ramifications of Civil Society for a Regional Resource Struggle, 39 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 437 (2001)
(noting the impact of civil groups' sustained engagement with, and pressures on, both state
and non-state actors in elevating or compelling the entrance of a human rights problem onto
the national agenda, warranting more urgent resolutions than would have been the case).
127. In spite of all pretensions, human rights and law-especially international law-
remain what a community or its powerful members say they are. See John O'Manique,
Development, Human Rights and Law, HUM. RTs. Q. 383, 405-06 (1992); W. Michael Reisman,
International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 101-20 (1981).
128. See Thomas, supra note 98, at 171-72.
129. According to Philip Alston, the U.S. presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan
and George H. Bush rejected entirely the notion of ESCR. Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 365 (1990).
130. Other tactics include: the perpetuation of indebtedness and initiation of catastrophic
economic polices, see Guiss6, supra note 4, at para. 60; Rhoda E. Howard, Civil Conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Internally Generated Causes, 51 INT'L J. 26, 32 (1996); Orford, supra note 111, at
464-75; pressuring the various countries to open up their borders to permit the dumping of
products that end up stifling local industries, see Kent, supra note 58; toppling regimes that are
opposed to these tactics, see Ariande K. Sacharoff, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be
[Vol. 5
26
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 5 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol5/iss1/5
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Africa
past few years, some Western states, particularly the United States, have
undermined the efforts of certain developing countries to obtain cheaper
generic drugs by threatening trade sanctions, notwithstanding that "drug
costs account for up to 60 percent of health care budgets in poor
countries." 131 In a crass show of insensitivity, the U.S. fought South Africa's
policies to procure cheaper generic HIV drugs, in spite of clear evidence of
a catastrophic AIDS epidemic in South Africa. According to Bess-Carolina
Dolmo, even when U.S. pressure on South Africa was eased due mainly to
pressures from civil society groups, the U.S. still directed its "arsenal trade
attacks" on "other nations that have enacted [similar] measures permitting
compulsory licensing and parallel trade....,132
The foregoing example is emblematic of developed states' attitudes
towards developing states' socio-economic development. In his final
report on the impunity of perpetrators of ESCR violations, U.N.
Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur, Mr. El Hadji Guisse
notes:
During the discussions on the methods of implementing economic,
social and cultural rights, .... the representatives of several
developing countries expressed the fear that the inevitably slow
progress in realizing those rights might be taken for unwillingness
on their part. They had not reckoned with the developed countries'
determination to undermine any possible basis for a truly fair world
economic order where economic, social and cultural rights would have a
fair chance of being realized. It was soon observed afterwards that
the fears of the former and the hypocrisy of the latter very rapidly
became a source of massive grave violations of economic, social
and cultural rights .... 133
Held Accountable for Human Rights Violations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 928-64 (1998) (describing
the toppling of regimes that insisted on improving the lots of the people); and exporting
harmful and hazardous wastes that imperil the health of the recipient states while at the same
time goading them to cut back on health care, see James H. Colopy, Poisoning the Developing
World: The Exportation of Unregistered and Severely Restricted Pesticides from the United States, 13
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 167, 171-81 (1995). A World Bank Chief Economist (and former
U.S. Treasury Secretary under Clinton) wrote in an internal memo:
I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the
lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that.... I've
always thought that under-populated countries in Africa are vastly
under-polluted; their air quality is probably vastly inefficiently [high]
compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City.
Let Them Eat Pollution, ECONOMIST (London), Feb. 8, 1992, at 66; see also Pollution and the Poor,
EcoNoMIST (London), Feb. 15,1992, at 18.
131. Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Examining Global Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals in the Face of
Patent Protection Rights: The South African Example, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 137, 151 (2001);
see also Blood and Gore: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Goes Too Far in Promoting Interests of
U.S. Drug Companies Abroad, THE NATION, July 19, 1999, at 16, available at
http://past.thenation.com/1999/990719.shtm (last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
132. Dolmo, supra note 131, at 151.
133. Guiss6, supra note 4, at para. 16 (emphasis added); see also Why King Gold Has No
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The inescapable conclusion is that, not only did the international
community fail to provide the active support it might have, but also
members of the international community actively hindered the
development of ESCR. Without such hostile interference, ESCR might
have fared better in many African states than they have.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF CONTINUED MARGINALIZATION
Certain implications are conspicuously discernible from the continued
marginalization of the enforcement of ESCR. As Henry Shue observes, "to
enjoy something only at the discretion of someone else, especially someone
powerful enough to deprive you of it at will, is precisely not to enjoy a right
to it."134 The notion of a non-enforceable right is nothing but a negation of
the very concept of right.135 Continued marginalization of the enforcement
of ESCR dresses these rights in the garb of mere luxuries. This deception is
emblematic and symptomatic of the continued oppression, and relegation
to second-class citizens, of those most dependent on such rights for basic
survival. 136
For a region that has staked its integrity on the adoption of a document
that gives equal prominence to all aspects of human rights, maintaining a
contradictory posture at the domestic level is an exercise in self ridicule. It
also casts the Charter in a bad light for proclaiming what cannot be
guaranteed. By marginalizing the enforcement of these rights, the African
claim that the satisfaction of ESCR is the precondition for the enjoyment of
civil and political rights in international fora rings hollow and remains
exposed for what it is: a poor excuse for insensate violations.
The continued marginalization of ESCR also deepens the collective
feeling of betrayal of the African people. The modern state's displacement
of traditional African systems, which, to a great extent, ensured the welfare
of every member of the community, failed to bring with it an adequate
replacement. 137 Unlike traditional structures, the state appears as a remote
center of power that has no relevance to the lives of the people. This
feeling of betrayal manifests itself in various forms, including lack of faith
in the process of supposed democratic governance.
Accordingly, one of the most serious consequences of the continued
marginalization of ESCR is the prolongation of the existing crisis of state
and governmental legitimacy in Africa. People hold minimum
Clothes, 402 NEw AFR., Dec. 2001, at 29-37 (describing other instances of undermining the basis
for a fair economic order).
134. Henry Shue, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 78
(1980).
135. According to Dinah Shelton, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 37
(1999), "[a] state that fails to protect fully individuals against human rights violations or that
otherwise violates remedial rights commits an independent, further violation of
internationally -recognized human rights."
136. See Skogly, supra, note 41, at 770 (discussing the advantages of effective recognition of
all human rights, especially economic, social and cultural rights).
137. See Agbakwa, supra note 47, at 100-09.
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expectations of their state and government. These expectations are "the
irreducible duties of any ruling apparatus to its subjects, such that a failure
to discharge these duties vitiates the legitimacy of the regime's assertion of
authority." 138 When such expectations are not met, it fuels the general level
of disaffection and dissatisfaction that may lead to the fall of the
government, either by constitutional or extra-constitutional means. As Jack
Donnelly argues:
The link between a regime's ability to foster development
(prosperity) and the public's perception of the regime's legitimacy
is close to a universal, cross-cultural political law. Whatever a
ruling regime's sociological and ideological bases, its sustained or
severe inability to deliver prosperity, however that may be understood
locally, typically leads to a serious political challenge.
1 39
Donnelly's argument is particularly apt for Africa. As has been argued
earlier, the continued deprivation of ESCR sometimes leads to popular
insurrections and civil war.14° In such situations, existing governments are
perceived as having outlived their usefulness as a result of the
deterioration of the basic socio-economic rights of the people.1 41 As in
Somalia, crisis generated by an attempt to oust an incumbent government
threatens the foundations of the state and may lead to its disintegration.
In the ensuing crisis of legitimacy, maintaining law and order can be
difficult or impossible, and civil and political rights are likely to be
neglected. Economic activities are also truncated, thus imperiling
developmental efforts. This bad situation is made worse when people are
138. Brad R. Roth, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1999). For a
critique of Roth, see James Thuo Gathii, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 1996 (2000) (book review).
139. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 609 (emphasis added).
140. See supra notes 19, 20, 23-26. In its 1979-80 annual report, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights noted the existence of an "organic relationship between the
violation of rights to physical security on the one hand, and neglect of economic and social
rights... on the other." It further noted that "neglect of economic and social rights, especially
when political participation has been suppressed, produces the kind of social polarization that
leads to acts of terrorism by and against the government." INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 1979-80, at 151 (1980). The Commission reiterated in 1991
that "it is evident that in many cases poverty is a wellspring of political and social conflict."
ANNUAL REPORT 1991, at 305 (1991); see also Orford, supra note 111, at 451-55 (noting the role of
economic crisis in the loss of legitimacy of the Yugoslavian federal government, which
snowballed into fratricidal civil conflict). But see Milner et al., supra note 28, at 412 (arguing
that "people at the lowest level of needs fulfilment would have neither the wherewithal nor
the energy to pose threats to a regime, no matter how displeased they were with the status
quo").
141. The civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and to an extent Angola, owe their origin and
continuation to the deterioration of the basic socio-economic rights of the people. See
Anthony Barclay, Consolidating Peace Through Governance and Regional Cooperation: The Liberian
Experience, in AFRICAN CONFLICTS, supra note 23, at 303-05; John B. Leggah et al., Sierra Leone,
in AFRICAN CONFLIcTS, supra note 23, at 181; Reginald Green, Angola: Seeking to Remedy the
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displaced as refugees.
Even in the absence of a full-blown civil conflagration, want and
deprivation create an atmosphere that is not conducive to the enjoyment of
civil and political rights. As Donnelly states, "those living on the economic
edge or with no realistic prospect of a better life for their children are much
less likely to be willing to accommodate the interests and rights of
others." 142 Thus, in the absence of measures that are likely to ensure the
realization of all rights, protecting only civil and political rights without
ESCR is tantamount to making ropes out of sand.
Protecting all rights requires both the implementation of existing
approaches, like effective judicial review, and the development of
alternative approaches, as discussed in the next section.
V. STRATEGIZING THE WAY FORWARD
A. Rejection of the Western Model
Unless there is a committed rejection of the dominant Western
paradigm that has historically viewed civil and political rights as the rights
that are most worthy of enforcement, substantial progress towards the
enforcement of ESCR in Africa may continue to elude African states. The
West may be able to maintain such a model, because its attainment of an
appreciable standard of living provides an environment that enables the
enjoyment of civil and political rights. African states do not enjoy this
luxury. They cannot afford this model without facing widespread civil and
social strife. Already, by adopting a charter that departs markedly from
the European Convention and Inter-American Convention, African states
demonstrated an understanding of the inadequacies of the two systems for
their purposes. A rejection of the Western model, therefore, merely
requires a practical commitment to the noble intentions expressed in the
African Charter.
This practical commitment does not necessarily entail guaranteeing the
maximum enjoyment of all the Charter's provisions on ESCR. Rather, it
requires judicial (including quasi-judicial and other forms of independent
review), legislative, and executive actions to ensure a baseline, minimum
protection of all rights equally. A truly African approach is one that
practically parallels the African Charter or one that critically reflects the
South African model.
Rejection of the Western model, as advocated here, presupposes a
complete rejection of ideologies that subordinate ESCR. It does not,
however, advocate a puritanical isolationist movement that heedlessly
rejects the obvious achievements of the institutional structures of Western
human rights regimes. As the next section demonstrates, the institutional
142. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 610.
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mechanisms of these older regimes have something important to offer in
spite of their normative and ideological shackles.
B. Alternative Enforcement Approach
The best way to effectuate any human rights provision may be to
subject it to direct judicial scrutiny in the way that many systems currently
protect certain human rights.143 For ESCR, such procedures are lacking in
many African states. Given the necessity of ensuring effective protection of
human dignity-the enjoyment and protection of all rights without
discrimination -additional means ought to be utilized to give effect to
ESCR provisions.
In recommending the adoption of the following approaches, I am wary
of appearing to advocate subjugation of ESCR to other rights. I do not.
Rather, these approaches are put forward as interim measures pending the
adoption by state authorities of a regime of directly enforceable (justiciable)
ESCR. Ironically perhaps, I draw insights from the jurisprudence of
Western human rights systems (European and Inter-American) that place
ESCR in a subservient position and whose ideological foundations I
partially reject. However, if, as I have argued, it is true that ESCR and
other rights are inseparable, it should not be surprising that effective
systems set up to protect the latter will find their way into the territory of
the former. These regimes have recently demonstrated an ability to adjust
to the challenges of addressing basic violations of ESCR. 44 In particular,
the European Court on Human Rights offers a rich insight into how a
progressive judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative body can transcend
normative hurdles in finding solutions to serious human rights problems.
Its jurisprudence is, therefore, relevant for immediately effectuating ESCR
in African states where these rights are still not domestically justiciable,
notwithstanding the provisions of the African Charter.
1. Concerted and Integrated Approach
The fact that ESCR are regarded as mere aspirations and are non-
justiciable in several African constitutions, 145 as well as largely ignored at
the regional level, means that there is as yet no hope for their direct judicial
143. While judicial remedies constitute the principal guarantees of human rights, they do
not always present the most desirable means by which to affirm these rights. Sometimes,
given their costly, time-consuming, and procedure-laden nature, individuals may prefer to
pursue administrative avenues to settle their disputes. Indeed, there is growing evidence that
individuals are turning to non-judicial remedies. See Wieruszewski, supra note 35, at 279 n.13.
In light of this fact, the approaches discussed below are equally amenable to judicial, quasi-
judicial, and administrative measures.
144. For insight into how the ECHR is adapting to the challenges of basic violations of
ESCR, see, for example, Aisling Reidy et al., Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the
European Convention on Human Rights in the Case of Turkey, 15 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 161 (1997).
145. Above, I have listed examples of such constitutions. See supra note 46.
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enforcement as independent rights. Accordingly, a concerted and
integrated approach that takes advantage of currently enforced rights is
needed.
The concerted and integrated approach seeks to enforce ESCR through
the provisions on civil and political rights that are, or usually are,
justiciable. 146 Using this method, ESCR can get their foot in the door,
where they can be developed, expanded, and enforced by the domestic
courts, the African Court of Human Rights (when it becomes operational),
the African Commission, and national human rights commissions (where
they exist).147 It is not certain that these African institutions will rise to the
occasion, but there is a strong chance of it. These institutions will merely
be holding the states to the standards they recognized by ratifying the
Charter and to which the states assumed a definite and binding obligation
to give effect in their respective domestic legal order.148 It is clear that
some African judges would make the most of an opportunity to put ESCR
and other rights on equal footing. As a retired Justice of the Nigerian
Supreme Court recognized:
The fundamental rights provisions of our Constitution (dealing
with civil and political rights) cannot be appreciated let alone
enjoyed in a state of utter illiteracy and abject poverty. To attain
true liberty and freedom the average [citizen] needs to have equal
access to... decent housing and health services. If these
opportunities are not equal and, or, equally accessible, then the talk
of liberty, of equality or even justice will be a far cry .... 149
The concerted and integrated approach accords with the functional or
interpretative approach practiced by the European Court of Human Rights.
Under the European system of human rights, State Parties' obligations with
respect to socio-economic rights are, in the words of Matti Pellonpaa, "of a
somewhat less straightforward nature, and the international supervision
146. See Bard-Anders Andreassen, Article 22, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVEMENT 453, 487 (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjom
Eide eds., 1999).
147. Human rights commissions currently exist in a number of African states, including
Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South
Africa, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. Plans are underway to establish such commissions
in Ethiopia and Tanzania. Many of the commissions, however, have remained administrative
outposts for the government of the day and have proven to be disappointments. Many have
very limited and flawed mandates with limited ability to investigate, monitor, or make public
statements. But some-like the Ghanaian, Senegalese, South African, Nigerian and Ugandan
commissions-appear very promising in their activities so far. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1999, at 12-13 (1998). For a detailed assessment of the
performance of some of these commissions, see Obiora Chinedu Okafor & Shedrack C.
Agbakwa, On Legalism, Popular Agency and "Voices of Suffering": The Nigerian National Human
Rights Commission in Context, 24 HUM. RTs. Q. (forthcoming Aug. 2002).
148. See U.N. Committee on ESCR, General Comment No. 9, U.N. Doc.E/C.12/1998/24,
reprinted in 6 INTL HUM. RTS. REP. 289 (1999).
149. C. A. Oputa, Commentary, in ALL NIGERIAN JUDGES CONFERENCE PAPERS 1982, at 290
(A. G. 0. Agbaje ed., 1983).
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far less effective"15° having been left to the less judicial mechanisms of the
European Social Charter. 151 In the absence of judicial enforcement for
rights provided under the Social Charter, the European Court has assumed
a dynamic mode of interpretation that seeks to effectuate the socio-
economic rights provided in the Social Charter. In Airey v. Ireland, the
European Court of Human Rights found connection between the classical
civil liberties covered by the European Convention and socio-economic
rights covered by the Social Charter. 152 The Court noted:
Whilst the [European Convention on Human Rights] sets forth
what are essentially civil and political rights, many of them have
implications of a social or economic nature. The Court therefore
considers, like the Commission, that the mere fact that an
interpretation of the Convention may extend into the sphere of
social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against
such an interpretation; there is no water-tight division separating that
sphere from the field of the Convention.153
In Airey, the Court held that a person seeking legal separation from a
spouse had a right to legal aid if she could not afford to pay a lawyer. The
Court found that denying Ms. Airey such aid amounted to a violation of
her right of access to courts and of her right to a fair trial guaranteed by
Article 6 of the European Convention. The Court rejected the
Government's argument that "the [European] Convention should not be
interpreted so as to achieve social and economic developments in a
Contracting State."154 The case shows how political rights can be used to
secure economic rights, and indeed, how they are inextricably linked.
In Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland,155 the Court extended protections
against discrimination under Article 6(1) and Article 14 of the European
Convention to ESCR. The Court held, "today the general rule is that
Article 6(1) does apply in the field of social insurance, including even
welfare assistance." 156 In Akdivar v. Turkey,157 the Court recognized claims
that forced evictions violated the right to privacy under Article 8 of the
European Convention. Similarly, in Feldbrugge v. The Netherlands'58 and
150. Matti Pellonpaa, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR
THE PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGH-S 855, 857 (R. St. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
151. European Social Charter, entered into force Feb. 26, 1965, Europ. T.S. No. 35, 529
U.N.T.S. 89.
152. Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 61 (1979), 2 EuR. H.R. REP. 305 (1979).
153. Id. at 316-17 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 316.
155. Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 263 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 7, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 405
(1993).
156. Id. at 430; see also Salesi v. Italy, 257 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 54 (1993).
157. Akdivar v. Turkey, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1192 (1996), reprinted in 1 BUTERWORTHS
HuM. RTS. CASES 137 (1996).
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Deumeland v. Germany,159 the Court extended the non-discrimination right
to health insurance allowances.
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has also applied the integrated
approach, using non-discrimination guarantees in Article 26 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to require
unemployment benefits. 16° An integrated approach may also be inferred
from the Human Rights Committee's elaboration on the "social dimension"
of the right to life. In its General Comments No. 6 on the right to life, 161 the
Committee noted the desirability for states to take "all possible measures to
reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in
adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics." 162
Using the integrated approach in Tavares v. France,163 the European
Commission recognized that a public-health system falling below a certain
minimum level of quality could be in breach of a state's obligation to
protect the right to life under Article 2 of the European Convention.
Although the Commission did not find the respondents liable, it clearly
demonstrated that regulatory measures aimed at protecting life with
regard to the hospital system are inherent in the Convention's protection of
the right to life.164
Following examples such as these, domestic courts, National Human
Rights Institutions, the African Court, and the African Commission can
creatively enforce ESCR through civil and political rights. Using this
integrated and concerted approach, for instance, the right to health can be
enforced through the right to life, for it is absurd to claim to have a right to
life if the individual is so poor that she cannot afford the cost of adequate
medical treatment to enable her to enjoy the right to life. It may also
amount to unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of life' 65 if the victim does
not have access to adequate and sufficient medical facilities or treatment.166
Likewise, the integrated and concerted approach can be used to
enforce the right to education through the right to freedom of expression
and the right to participate in the governance of one's country. 167 As a
legacy of colonialism, African states conduct many affairs in official
159. Deumeland v. Germany, 100 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 7 (1986), 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 448
(1986).
160. F. H. Zwaan-de Vries v. The Netherlands, U.N. HUM. Rrs. CoMM., Communication
No. 182/1984, Supp. No. 40, at 160, U.N. Doc. A/42/40 (1987).
161. General Comment 6, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Annex 5, Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc
A/37/40 (1982), reprinted as Annex 3, in TEXTBOOK, supra note 36, at 454-55.
162. Id. at 454, 5.
163. Tavares v. France, App. No. 16593/90, Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (Sept. 12,1991)
(unreported), reprinted in Pellonpaa, supra note 151, at 865.
164. See id.
165. See Afr. Charter, supra note 2, at art. 4; see also FED. REP. NIG. CONST. § 33; REP. S. AFR.
CONST. § 11.
166. See Pellonpaa, supra note 150, at 868-69 (arguing that right to life presupposes a
certain minimum level of health services and that respect for private and family life under
Article 8 of the European Convention may in certain circumstances oblige the state to provide
housing to the homeless).
167. See Afr. Charter, supra note 2, art. 13(1).
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languages that are different from the original language of the people in
these states. Most states have laws imposing a minimum qualification as a
precondition for aspiring to elective positions. In order to guarantee the
political right to participation in governance, African institutions will need
to ensure the right to acquire requisite qualifications and basic education.
For the same reasons, individuals could seek the right of equal access
to state public services168 based on the freedom from discrimination. After
all, those who do not meet the imposed minimum qualifications for
aspiring to elective offices due to inadequate educational opportunities are
victims of state sanctioned discrimination. A state ought not to raise
participatory thresholds to disbar some citizens when, at the same time, it
cannot provide those who are likely to be disqualified with the enabling
environment and facilities for meeting the threshold.
Enforcing a person's right to participate in government, to express
herself freely, or to be free from discrimination in the foregoing instances
would not necessarily obligate de jure the state to provide free education as
such. Rather, it obligates the state not to deny its people participation,
access, or other civil services implicated by the policies. However, it will
quickly be apparent that de facto these rights require a minimum level of
education, health, or other social services.
Using the integrated and concerted approach may avoid the obstacles
posed by the ambiguity of the ESCR provisions of the African Charter.
Rather than debating which of two or more possible interpretations is
correct, this approach concentrates on the practical effectuation of the spirit
and substance of the provision. Moreover, the integrated and concerted
approach will be in keeping with the holistic, traditional African
philosophy and conception of rights, the virtues of which are the
"historical tradition and values of African civilization [that] inspire and
characterize [the] reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights"
in the African Charter. 169
Evidently, the reach of this approach is limited in the sense that a
victim who cannot fit her complaints within any of the justiciable
provisions of civil and political rights is likely to be left without a remedy.
Consequently, this approach is no replacement for a system of direct
justiciability and enforcement of ESCR. Nor does this approach obviate the
need to amend the African Charter to strengthen its normative and
institutional framework.1 70 To those proposed amendments should be
added a change to the Protocol of the African Court to provide for direct
individual access. 171 It is not part of Africa's traditional heritage that a
168. See Afr. Charter, supra note 2, art. 13(2).
169. See Afr. Charter, supra note 2, at pmbl., 5.
170. See Mutua, African Human Rights Court, supra note 72, at 358.
171. Article 34(6) of the Protocol renders the competence of the Court to accept cases
directly from individuals dependent upon the consent of the State Party involved. See Protocol
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 34, § 6, OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (Il),
adopted June 9, 1998, reprinted in 6 INT'L HuM. RTS. REP. 891 (1999). For a critique of this
provision, see Mutua, African Human Rights Court, supra note 72, at 355.
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person against whom a complaint is to be made must first give her consent.
There is no good reason for a state to benefit from such a shield.
2. Minimum Threshold Approach
Commentators have described the Inter-American Commission's
attempt to give effect to ESCR as the "minimum threshold approach." 172
The term does not appear in the Convention. 73 The emphasis of this
approach is on equal recognition and implementation of all human rights.
As explained by Craven, "[riather than creating any a priori hierarchy of
rights or emphasizing categorical differences in implementation, the
minimum threshold approach advocates the necessity of action being taken
across the board to ensure for all a minimum level of enjoyment of the
whole range of human rights."174
In 1980, the Commission determined that State Parties should "strive to
attain the economic and social aspirations of its people by following an
order that assigns priority to... the 'rights of survival' and 'basic
needs. '" 175 In 1993, the Commission explained that the obligation to
observe and defend human rights of individuals in the American Declaration
and the American Convention "obligates [states], regardless of the level of
economic development, to guarantee a minimum threshold of these
rights."176
As recognized by the Commission, the minimum threshold approach
encapsulates a number of basic principles that are fundamental to the
implementation of ESCR. Among other things, this approach calls for "the
identification of the most deprived groups" 177 and demands "that in the
creation and implementation of economic and social policies, states should
place emphasis, as a priority, upon assisting the poorest and the most
vulnerable in society." 178 In order to realize the minimum threshold, the
Commission underscored the importance of "pay[ing] close attention to the
equitable and effective use of available resources and the allocation of
172. See Bard-Anders Andreassen et al., Assessing Human Rights Performance in Developing
Countries: The Case for a Minimal Threshold Approach to Economic and Social Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1987/88, at 333 (Bard-Anders Andreassen & Asbjom Eide
eds., 1988).
173. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
OEA/ser. L/V/I.23, doc. 2 rev. 6, 1, O.A.S.O.R. OEA/ser. K./XVI/I.1, doc. 65 rev. 1 corr. 2
(1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). But see Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17,
1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (1988), OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, 67 (1992), reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
156 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999).
174. Matthew Craven, The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Under the Inter-
American System of Human Rights, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 289, 317
(David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998).
175. See INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1979-80, at 152 (1980).
176. INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1993, at 524 (1993).
177. Asbjorn Eide, Realization of Social and Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold
Approach, 10 HuM. RTS. L.J. 35,47 (1989).
178. Craven, supra note 174, at 318.
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public expenditures to social programs that address the living conditions of
the more vulnerable sectors of society .... 179
The Commission's minimum threshold is in line with the
jurisprudence of the U.N. Committee on ESCR. In its General Comment No.
3,180 the Committee spoke of "a minimum core obligation" necessary to
"ensure the satisfaction, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each
of the rights."181 According to the Committee, the existence of resource
constraints does not in any way eliminate State Parties' obligations to
protect "the vulnerable members of society." 182
Although, for the most part, the Inter-American Commission's
pronouncements hover in the region of the abstract, and the Commission
has not put itself in a position to review claims of ESCR violations' 83, the
minimum threshold approach holds potential to advance the cause of
ESCR. An effective human rights commission, whether national or
regional, could utilize the approach to require state accountability for those
policies, decisions, and practices that would diminish the provision of
ESCR. A court or commission could invoke the approach to ensure that a
State Party does not amass instruments of torture in the name of state
security or spend excessively on defense while inadequately supporting
measures to protect the health of the people. Considering the "equitable
and effective use of available resources"184, a court or commission could
compel a government to justify its priorities, for instance where it chooses
to embark on a prestige development project or construct a sports stadium
while neglecting dilapidated health facilities.
Using the minimum threshold approach, the African Commission or
the African Court could set up country-specific thresholds (or minimum
core obligations) measured by indicators' 85 to determine what amounts to
"the best attainable state of physical and mental health" or "necessary
measures to protect the health of their people." 186 In this way, what the
government can or cannot afford can be independently verified and
juxtaposed with other competing national priorities. This baseline
approach could also be used to set up benchmarks to measure the "equity"
179. INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N, supra note 174, at 533.
180. Gen. Comment No. 3, U.N. COMM. ESCR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, Annex III, U.N.
Doc.E/1991/23 (1990). For a brief analysis of the Comment, see Scott Leckie, An Overview and
Appraisal of the Fifth Session of the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 13
HUM. RmS. Q. 545,562-65 (1991).
181. See U.N. COMM. ON ESCR, supra note 180, at 10.
182. Id. at 11-12.
183. See Craven, supra note 174, at 318.
184. Fairness and appropriateness of governmental actions and proposed or actual
expenditures are implicated in the phrase "equitable and effective use of available resources."
A creative and effective use of the minimum threshold approach will necessarily involve
evaluating the fairness of a state's actions (vis-&-vis the most vulnerable group) and the
appropriateness of its use (or allocation) of resources.
185. See Maria Green, What We Talk About When We Talk About Indicators: Current
Approaches to Human Rights Measurement, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 1062, 1065 (2001) (defining a human
rights "indicator" as "a piece of information used in measuring the extent to which a legal
right is being fulfilled or enjoyed in a given situation").
186. Afr. Charter, supra note 2, art. 16.
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and "satisfaction" in "equitable and satisfactory working conditions."187
With the aid of such indicators, it would be easier to ascertain or monitor
when a state fails to fulfill its obligations. 188 Admittedly, fixing a minimum
threshold is more of an administrative duty properly exercised by a non-
judicial body like the Commission. Nonetheless, it is not inconceivable for
a court to embark on such an exercise. A court can always encompass such
an exercise within its notions of fairness and equity. After all, the category
of fairness is never closed and can be expanded to embrace new situations.
One obstacle to a court-directed minimum threshold approach is that
the allocation of resources is a policy matter properly left to the executive
and legislature. The difference with respect to the courts' involvement in
the minimum threshold approach would "be one of degree and not
kind." 189 Courts frequently make decisions and orders based on public
policy.19° Lord Denning and Lord Diplock of the English Bench have
revealed their consideration of policy issues in determining cases. 191
Courts' decisions regularly impact the application of resources as well.
Where the court finds the state liable for violating a citizen's right to
personal liberty and awards damages for unlawful detention, such a
decision implicates the state's application of resources. Where the court
finds a state liable for failure to protect a citizen from counter-
demonstrators while in the lawful exercise of her freedom of expression, it
is unlikely that the state will prevail on a defense based on lack of
resources to recruit and equip police officers. Although the threat of future
damages will likely induce the state to increase funding for public safety,
the court is not blamed for making decisions on the allocation of resources.
187. See Afr. Charter, supra note 2, art. 15.
188. See Andreassen et al., supra note 172, at 341 (noting that when the threshold approach
is adopted "[tihe scope of violation ofsocio-economic rights would then refer to the percentage of
the population not assured of this minimal threshold, in the first instance, and further involve the
question of whether such failure of minimal threshold assurance is evenly or unevenly
distributed by group, defined by ethnicity, race, occupation etc ..." (emphasis added)). Philip
Alston appears to be making a case for the minimum threshold approach when he states:
The fact that there must exist such a [minimum] core [content of each
right that cannot be diminished under any pretext]... would seem to be a
logical implication of the use of the terminology of rights. In other words,
there would be no justification for elevating a "claim" to the status of a
right (with all the connotations that concept is generally assumed to have)
if its normative content could be so indeterminate as to allow for the
possibility that the rightholders possess no particular entitlement to
anything. Each right must therefore give rise to an absolute minimum
entitlement in the absence of which a state party is to be considered to be
in violation of it[s] obligations.
Philip Alston, Out of Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. Rms. Q. 332,352-53 (1987).
189. DAVID KINLEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPLIANCE
WITHOUT INCORPORATION 6-10 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
190. Id. at 6-10.
191. See Magor & St. Mellons Rural Dist. Council v. Newport Corp., 2 All E.R. 1226, 1235-
37 (1950) (illustrating Lord Denning's opinion); Spartan Steel & Alloys v. Martin & Co.
(Contractors) Ltd., 1 Q.B. 27, 36 (1973) (same); see also O'Reilly v. Mackman, 2 A.C. 237, 285
(1983) (illustrating Lord Diplock's opinion).
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The minimum threshold approach, therefore, is not an entirely novel
practice, but an extension of an already existing practice. Even if it were
entirely new, this is no reason, by itself, to reject it. The courts are put in
place to do justice. Justice must shift and adjust to cover new situations
and the demands of the times. If the courts are not sufficiently equipped,
they should be and the earlier the better.
The minimum threshold approach can reinforce the concerted and
integrated approach and make it more effective. A court or commission
could hold a State Party to be in violation of the right of an individual to
"respect of the dignity inherent in a human being" 192 where the individual
has been made to live below the threshold set for the defendant State Party.
In this way, it would be more difficult for a state or government to use lack
of development as a defense, because its financial abilities would have
been independently assessed and factored into its minimum threshold.
If these two approaches were combined effectively, it might be possible
to provide greater, effective ESCR protection under the African Charter,
even in the absence of direct national judicial enforcement. Regardless, the
integrated and minimum threshold approaches should be a first step, and
not the end game, in the overall effort to accord due, equal relevance to
ESCR under the African Charter at both the national and regional levels.
VI. CONCLUSION
Human rights in Africa should be a quintessence of Africa's attempt to
reclaim humanity following its devaluation by the most invidious abuses,
especially the slavo-colonial, tentacular reach of some European states.
Full reclamation of humanity entails equal emphasis on what it takes to be
human. This equal emphasis translates into equal enforcement of all human
rights, whether civil and political or ESCR, without discrimination. It
requires a change of attitude towards ESCR in contemporary Africa.
Protecting and enforcing only civil and political rights in a situation of
exacerbated civil and political strife occasioned by worsening socio-
economic conditions "projects an image of truncated humanity." 193 It
"excludes those segments of society [the overwhelming majority] for whom
autonomy means little without the [basic] necessities of life."1 94 As the South
African Constitutional Court underlined in Grootboom: "A society must
seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all if it is to
be a society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. " 195 The
solution lies in adopting a truly holistic view of human dignity: one that is
"pursued in light of both the overarching purposes and underlying values
of human rights protection, rather than under the constraint of false
192. See Afr. Charter, supra note 2, art. 5.
193. Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?:
Social Rights in a New South Afican Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 29 (1992).
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169, 44 (CC), available at
http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/2000/grootbooml.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
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dichotomies." 196
196. Craig Scott, Reaching Beyond (Without Abandoning) the Category of "Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights", 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 633, 664 (1999).
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